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CREATING A CLIENT CONSORTIUM:
BUILDING SOCIAL CAPITAL, BRIDGING
STRUCTURAL HOLES
SUSAN D. BENNETr*
This article asks whether, ethically and practically, community
lawyers can enhance the representation they provide to their individ-
ual community-based organizational clients by representing them col-
lectively. Too often isolated from critical resources, community clients
can advance their agendas for economic and social justice only so far
when they and their lawyer act alone. These clients need to build con-
nections to other groups in the community, actors whom the lawyer
may also represent, as well as to influential players who operate in
distant financial and political arenas. Arguably the most effective rep-
resentation a lawyer could provide to any one client would be to link
it with other group clients with complementary strengths and needs.
The resulting "Community Client Consortium" would operate as a
forum and framework within which those clients could allocate their
resources according to their sense of common mission - one of those
resources being that of their shared lawyer's representation. The arti-
cle uses the device of a "Community Client Retainer," an agreement
that each new organizational client may choose to sign, and which
obligates the client to engage in a process of collective decision-mak-
ing among all the members of the "Client Consortium" about com-
mon goals and resources. The article asks whether lawyers can within
the bounds of honoring client autonomy require this kind of collec-
tive decision-making, perhaps at perceived cost to any one client's
individual institutional advantage.
Ethics rules that focus on the inviolability of the dyadic lawyer-
client relationship provide only ambiguous guidance to the commu-
nity lawyer if she attempts to leverage the strengths of community-
based organizations by representing them in collaboration with each
other. The article addresses how the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and the jurisprudence of entity representation have evolved
to accommodate, or continue to frustrate, concerns about conflicts of
interest and breaches of confidentiality in "multiple representation."
The article concludes by reviewing the "sociology of neighboring,"
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which includes social capital and network theories, and which con-
firms that organizations are best served individually when they oper-
ate collectively. The article then recommends that the community
lawyer use her position by acting within network theory as a "man-
ager of structural holes," someone who serves as a critical point of
contact among disconnected people.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM
Two scenarios: one hypothetical, one less so:
A.
"... Lawyer has been retained by A and B, each a competitor for a
single broadcast license, to assist each of them in obtaining the li-
cense from Agency. Such work often requires advocacy by the law-
yer for an applicant before Agency. Lawyer's representation will
have an adverse effect on both A and B.... Even though either A
or B might obtain the license and thus arguably not have been ad-
versely affected by the joint representation, Lawyer will have duties
to A that restrict Lawyer's ability to urge B's application, and vice
versa. In most instances, informed consent of both A and B would
not suffice to allow the dual representation."'
B.
Lawyer has been retained by A and B, tenants' associations of adja-
cent public housing complexes, to assist each of them in basic mat-
ters of organization and corporate structuring. The lawyer deals
with each association through its elected president, and rarely sees
more than one of either association's other officers. In the several
years that each association has been Lawyer's client, A (through its
president) has maintained contact with the lawyer, reported on reg-
ular tenants' meetings, and assisted Lawyer in drafting by-laws and
articles of incorporation. By contrast, B has responded only sporadi-
cally to Lawyer's calls or requests for information, and has cancelled
corporate documents. Lawyer knows that B's president frequently
witholds information from the other officers, who repeatedly
threaten to quit.
Lawyer learns about a federal grant for technical assistance to pub-
lic housing tenants' associations. The grant would provide funds for
office supplies, as well as for consultants in bookkeeping, fundrais-
ing, organizational assistance, and management training. It is clear
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD): RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, §121
(2000).
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to the Lawyer that both organizations need such assistance badly, B
more than A. But her interactions with B make her question
whether B could administer such a grant. Even though either A or
B might obtain the grant and thus arguably not have been adversely
affected by the simultaneous representation, Lawyer's knowledge of
A and B restricts her ability to urge B's application, and vice versa.
Lawyer informs A and B of the existence of the grant, and, without
going into details, of her concerns that she cannot represent both of
them with equal zeal. A and B don't see the problem and signal a
willingness to waive any potential conflict of interest. Lawyer de-
clines to write the grant for both.2
C. Postscript to B.:
Neither A nor B gets the grant.
II. A SOLUTION: LAWYERING AND THE
"SOCIOLOGY OF NEIGHBORING"
Scenarios A and B represent similar situations as they might oc-
cur in different worlds. Scenario A is hypothetical, one view of how
little latitude the common law allows a lawyer in simultaneously advo-
cating for the competing economic interests of current clients.3 Scena-
rio B is based on an experience in the author's own practice, and
reflects more closely what might confront lawyers representing the in-
terests of small organizations in poor communities. In Scenario B, the
lawyer - quite unconscious that the drafters of the Restatement had
already thought this through for her and reached the same conclusion
- brought her considered professional judgment to bear on the situa-
tion, and helped no one.
That two similarly situated, financially strapped and organization-
ally compromised community groups might apply for exactly the same
limited source of funds is not surprising. Changes in policies and
practices of funding for human services have shifted the burden for
providing for basic human needs onto neighborhood-based groups,
who are compelled either to collaborate or compete for the same re-
sources.4 At the same time, changes in policies and practices of fund-
2 This situation derives from the author's experiences beginning in the late 1990's with
the representation of several community groups, within the structure of a law-school based
community development clinic.
3 For a different view, see R. David Donoghue, Conflicts ofInterest: Concurrent Repre-
sentation, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 319, 320, n.15 (1998)(citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 3 (1983) to support the position that an attorney may represent the
competing economic interests of current clients even without each client's consent). For
further discussion of the evolving doctrine of consentable "current conflicts" in light of the
work of the ABA's Ethics 2000 Commission, see Part IV.B., infra.
4 See, e.g., Lois M. Takahashi & Gayla Smutny, Collaboration Among Small, Commu-
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ing for community legal services have made it predictable that, in
some legal markets, neighborhood groups compete for the same -
maybe the only - lawyer. 5
"Collaborate or compete" defines the choices that resource-poor
organizations face under conditions of scarcity - unless the scarce re-
source is the lawyer. In that case, ethical complications arising from
joint or multiple representation make lawyers skeptical of collabora-
tion as an option. The client groups in Scenario B were untroubled by
the prospect of conflict of interest - they had no reason to feel divided
against each other, no reason to fear that the lawyer might feel di-
vided against either of them. These were lawyer's worries, born of
what the lawyer thought to be a responsible view of client conflicts
and of a duty to steer clear of them. The clients could have considered
a three-way conversation about the best allocation of the lawyer's re-
sources, and concluded that one, the other, or neither client, or both
clients together, would benefit the most or (a different consideration)
do the most good with the resource of representation. The lawyer
would never know, because the lawyer never asked.
As we will see, not only do the law and the norms of transactional
practice allow a lawyer facing Scenario B a less constrained approach
than the one described in the hypothetical, but the exigencies of com-
munity practice may require it. I will join others in suggesting that the
lawyer practicing "community development law" in its largest sense
must look at her relationships in a different way: not only in terms of
her obligations to her clients, but also in terms of her role in support-
ing her clients' obligations to others. Community development law re-
quires particular sensitivity to the client's networks of connection: in
any given transaction, the client's on-going relationships with funders,
regulators, and official and unofficial civic leaders will weigh as heav-
ily as the lawyer's skill. What we may fail to acknowledge is the law-
yer's place as another member of the network, and, by virtue of her
special knowledge of her clients' strengths and needs, her potential
place as an arranger and creator of networks.
To illustrate what such a representation might look like in prac-
tice, I will use the device of a "Community Client Retainer," an anno-
tated model retainer agreement. 6 The model presumes the client as
nity-Based Organizations, 21 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 141 (2001)(noting that decreased re-
sources and requirements of funders force community-based organizations into
collaborative partnerships).
5 For a discussion of the availability of free legal services to community-based organi-
zations, as distinct from individuals, through the federally funded Legal Services Corpora-
tion, through projects of state and city bar associations, and through law school clinics, see
Part IV.C., infra.
6 In her path-breaking review of the many ethical quandaries that community lawyers
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"entity," an identity with complications. It focuses not on the sub-
stance of the representation (surely a subject for many other articles),
but on as much as can be captured of the nuances of relationship be-
tween the lawyer and this client, and this client and the lawyer's other
community group clients. The "Community Client Retainer" contem-
plates the creation of a "Client Consortium," which structures contin-
uous dialogue among clients organized in a network to plan projects
for the future. The Consortium establishes a forum in which clients
collectively evaluate positional and economic conflicts, conflicts that
ethics rules allow but that actually may hurt clients in their community
relationships more than other more obvious conflicts of interest do.
The Retainer details the ground rules for entry and exit, for sharing
information, and for setting priorities. While the Retainer is in one
aspect a private document, a contract setting forth what the client or-
ganization can expect from its lawyer, it also sets out what the client
can expect from that lawyer's other like-minded organizational clients.
In short, it describes a network of relationships with rules, something
analogous to the "framework of dealing" to which William Simon has
referred in the context of representing one organization with individ-
ual constituents.7
After setting out the terms of the "Community Client Retainer,"
I will address - and, hopefully, assuage - the anxieties that community
lawyers might feel in considering this type of representation. The law-
yer who assists individual clients in forming small business entities,
such as partnerships or close corporations, faces ethical dilemmas
analogous to those confronting the community lawyer in the Client
Consortium. As I will explain, when a lawyer's individual clients ask
her to form a partnership to structure their shared business interests,
she maintains parallel allegiances to her individual clients and to the
welfare of the partnership that those clients asked her to create. The
lawyer for clients in a consortium will attend similarly to a balancing
of those individual and group interests. What clouds this type of com-
mon representation is the convention in legal ethics of one lawyer
with exclusive and undivided loyalties to one client, the model that
face as they try to satisfy obligations simultaneously to individuals in and outside of the
defined client-lawyer relationship, to groups, and to groups of groups, Shauna Marshall has
advised that the lawyer and community enter into a retainer agreement in which the com-
munity decides the strategy and goals of a particular project. Shauna I. Marshall, Mission
Impossible? Ethical Community Lawyering, 7 CLIN. L. REV.147,221 (2000). This retainer
originated many years ago with somewhat different concerns, but attempts to address
through the creation of an on-going community client group whether any given project
supports or obstructs the community's goals.
7 William H. Simon, Whom (Or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer Represent?:
An Anatomy of Intraclient Conflict, 91 CAL. L. REV. 57, 86 (2003).
Fall 20061
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
has monopolized our conceptualization of the client-lawyer relation-
ship.8 The one-on-one model has been criticized as particularly un-
helpful to the representation of small businesses, specifically
partnerships and close corporations. 9 My discussion of the ethics of
the Client Consortium will refer to that literature and to the develop-
ments in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct through which the
lawyer's obligations under "multiple representation," "joint represen-
tation," "intermediation," and, most recently, "common representa-
tion" have been most fully fleshed out. I will suggest that, as the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct have evolved to follow the ac-
tual practice of lawyers in the representation of groups, the Rules sup-
port the activities of lawyers in groups such as the Consortium.
Ethics rules ultimately will inform the lawyer's decision about
how or whether to accomplish her clients' goals through the medium
of multiple representation. But they stop short of explaining to the
lawyer the "why": why she should encourage her community-based
clients not only to work in concert with each other on certain defined
projects, but to consult as to the most effective combinations of their
and their lawyer's strengths in the future. As I will describe, the usual
arguments for efficiency, economy and familiarity certainly apply to
why community clients might want to retain their lawyers as they part-
ner with other clients, even at the risk of submerging their interests in
the collective. But those reasons do not fully explain the benefits of
continuing active and consultative relationships with others.
For organizations struggling to secure economic and social justice
within their community base, multiple representation offers more than
practicality: it throws out a lifeline. Client groups with few resources,
working in neighborhoods with even fewer resources, need links to
each other and to an indifferent world for their success and survival.
Parts V and VI of the article will address this need for links through a
review of the "sociology of neighboring,' 10 which encompasses social
capital theory, collective efficacy theory, structural holes theory and
even "broken windows" theory," and explain why it supports the
8 James Leubsdorf has referred to the traditional treatment in legal ethics of all repre-
sentations, least helpfully the representation of groups, as consisting of exclusive relation-
ships between lawyers and individual clients, as the "binary client system." James
Leubsdorf, Pluralizing the Client-Lawyer Relationship, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 825, 831
(1992).
9 For an overview of critiques of the applicability of the traditional ethics of one-on-
one representation to the representation of small client groups and entities, and of the
relevance of those critiques to the role of the lawyer in a "Client Consortium," see Part
IV.B., infra.
10 Xavier de Souza Briggs, Brown Kids in White Suburbs: Housing Mobility and the
Many Faces of Social Capital, 9 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 177, 208 (1998).
11 "Broken windows theory" refers to the hypothesis, first proposed by James Q. Wil-
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community lawyer's role in linking otherwise isolated organizational
clients with complementary strengths and needs. To borrow a term
from the sociology of neighboring, the community lawyer should con-
sider how she can serve her community of clients as a "manager of the
structural holes," someone who serves as a critical point of contact
among disconnected people. 12 I propose that the sociology of neigh-
boring shows that it is vital - for the sake of her clients - that the
community lawyer enhance the network-convening and strengthening
skills in which she already excels in her conventional transactional law
practice. This part suggests how the construct of the Client Consor-
tium helps the lawyer and her clients reinforce the processes of infor-
mation-sharing that take place among actors in a healthy community.
III. THE COMMUNITY CLIENT RETAINER AGREEMENT
Community Client Retainer Agreement
1. Scope of Work and Fees
The ABC Neighborhood Association, (the Association) with its
offices at 6000 Angier Place, Washington, D.C., retains the Coin
munity and Economic Development Law Clinic, (the Clinic) 4801
Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.,13 to represent the
Association [choice #1: in the following matters (see attached descrip-
tion, which representatives of the Association and the Clinic have
signed and which is incorporated into this agreement)] [choice #2: and
act as its counsel.]14 The Association will pay for the Clinic's services
according to the attached and signed fee agreement.1 5
son and George Kelling, that signs of deterioration in physical plant and in street conduct
signal and trigger more troubling processes of decay. See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W.
Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of "Bro-
ken Windows," 67 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 319, 319 (2004)(citing James 0. Wilson & George
Kelling, The Police and Neighborhood Safety: Broken Windows, 127 THE ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 29 (1982)). For an overview of the other theories grouped under the "sociology
of neighboring," see Part V., infra.
12 See Ronald S. Burt, The Contingent Value of Social Capital, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 339,
341 (1997) for a definition of "structural holes" and of "manager of the structural holes."
For a fuller discussion of structural hole theory, see Part V., infra.
13 The name and address of the client group are wholly fictional. I use the name and
address of my own clinic purely as illustration.
14 As I note in the text, for the purposes of this article I am not dwelling on the subject
matter of any particular representation, and have not attached the details of what that
might be in any one case.
15 Obviously, a practitioner should convey to her client a clear written description of
any fee arrangement, and could do so as an attachment to the retainer, or in a subsequent
writing. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Rule 1.5(b)(2002). While reciprocity of
obligations, above and beyond the fee and the substantive work, among lawyer, client and
Fall 2006]
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2. Participation in the Clinic's Client Consortium
a. Agreement to Share Information and to Collaborate on
Projects
The Association understands that, by authorizing its representa-
tive(s) to sign this retainer, it agrees to become a part of the Clinic's
Community Client Consortium, and that the other members of the
Consortium have approved its entry into the Consortium.a The Asso-
ciation will not unreasonably withold its approval of the entry of any
new clients into the Consortium. It acknowledges receipt of a list of
contact names, phone numbers and addresses of other client members
of the Consortium, and agrees to add its contact information to this
list, for distribution to the other members.b The Association agrees to
be available to any member of the Consortium for information and
assistance, and to seek collaboration with other members of the Con-
sortium on projects for which the Clinic may provide representation.
The Association agrees to attend a quarterly meeting of Consor-
tium members and representatives of the Clinic, for the purpose of
mutual consultation on funding strategies, legislative initiatives, and
other matters of concern to the group. It agrees to share information
about funding, contracting and training opportunities, and, where
sources of funding and training are limited, to participate in a process
of group deliberation to decide which member organization can make
best use of these resources to serve the communityc The Consortium
members will develop criteria for these deliberations. Where possible,
applications for resources will be joint.
The Association acknowledges that, whenever the Clinic repre-
sents it and other members of the Consortium in a collaborative pro-
ject, any information it releases to the Clinic may in turn be released
to the other members participating in the project.d The Clinic will re-
lease information about one participant to the others when that infor-
mation may affect the course of the project, such as when insolvency
of one participant may compromise completion of the project.e The
Clinic will advise the Association, in advance of releasing the informa-
tion, of why the information may be critical to the continuation of the
project.
The Association acknowledges that any information about its
own affairs, or about any project of the Consortium, that the Clinic
circulates to other members of the Consortium will not be protected
by attorney-client privilege; that is, if members of the Consortium in-
volved in a project or the Association are sued, the Clinic can be com-
other clients is important for this article, details of any particular fee arrangement are not,
so I have relegated them to a (non-existent) separate page.
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pelled to produce that information in court or in pleadings before a
matter goes to court.
b. Agreement to Have Projects Evaluated for Possible Conflicts
of Interest
The Association understands that, even though some projects in
which the Clinic may represent the Association may seem to be unre-
lated to the collaborative work of the Consortium, or to matters in
which the Clinic separately represents other members of the Consor-
tium, the projects in fact may hurt the work of the Consortium, or of
its other members. The Association consents to a review by all other
Consortium members of any new or on-going project to determine
whether such difficulties may exist, and whether they may be resolved
by modification of the project or by collaboration! f
3. Client's Capacity to Participate in the Representation g
The Association certifies that its membership/board of directors
has authorized its representatives to sign this retainer. The resolution
which reflects the approval of this representation by the Association's
membership/board of directors is attached. This resolution was voted
at a meeting of which the Association's membership/board of direc-
tors received proper notice according to the Association's by-laws.
The Association certifies that it holds regularly scheduled meet-
ings of its membership and/or of its governing body, and that it con-
venes these meetings according to the notice provisions and schedule
set forth in its by-laws. The Association has distributed copies of its
by-laws to all the membership and/or to its board of directors. If the
Association does not have by-laws, it understands that its representa-
tion will include drafting of by-laws.
The Association promises that it will take no major action relat-
ing to its case without consultation with and approval of its member-
ship/board of directors. "Major action" means any action for which
the by-laws require a vote by at least a quorum of the membership/
board of directors.
4. Modification and Termination of Representation
The Association is free to withdraw from membership in the Con-
sortium, or from representation as a non-Consortium client of the
Clinic, at any time. If the Association withdraws from the Consortium
alone, the Clinic will no longer release to it any information about
Consortium projects or about other members of the Consortium.
Representation by the Clinic of members in a collaborative Consor-
tium project may also cease if (1) the members involved in a project
Fall 2006]
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decide collectively that their individual interests have diverged to a
point where the Clinic no longer can represent the group as a whole,
or (2) any one member decides that it cannot release information to
the other Consortium members, as contemplated under Paragraph 2.a.
of the Retainer.?
The Association and the Clinic may always agree to change the
terms of their separate representation. The Association, Clinic and
Consortium may always change the terms of participation in the Con-
sortium, by consensus of the membership.'
5. What the Clinic Agrees to Dok
In addition to accomplishing the goals for the individual repre-
sentation set forth in the attached agreement, the Clinic agrees to do
the following:
a. Disclosure of Funding Sources
The Clinic will consult with the members of the Consortium if it
plans to apply for any funding from any local or federal government
agency or foundation, to underwrite the representation of all its cli-
ents. The Clinic will disclose any conditions which attach to the fund-
ing, particularly any conditions which might restrict the Clinic's ability
to represent members of the Consortium.
b. Disclosure of Law Reform Projects
The Clinic will consult with members of the Consortium if it plans
to engage in any systemic projects, such as impact litigation or legisla-
tive advocacy, which are not connected with work specifically author-
ized by the Consortium.
c. Agreement to Follow the Consortium's Direction in Securing
Resources
The Clinic will represent the member or members of the Consor-
tium that the Consortium collectively has designated as most likely to
benefit the community in seeking funding, contracting and training
opportunities, in their attempts to secure such funds, contracts and
training. The Clinic will endeavor to bring information about such
training and funding resources to the attention of all the members of
the Consortium, so that the members may make fully informed deci-
[Vol. 13:67
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sions about collaborative projects.
ABC Neighborhood Association Date
Community and Economic Date
Development Law Clinic
IV. THE CLIENTS, THEIR LAWYER, AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS
UNDER THE MODEL COMMUNITY CLIENT
RETAINER AGREEMENT
A. The Representation of Clients A and B within the
Community Client Consortium
What might the representation of Clients A and B, of Scenario B,
look like if each were to sign the "Community Client Retainer Agree-
ment"? The Agreement contemplates a model different from that de-
scribed in Scenario B. Scenario B suggests (and then rejects) the
possibility of concurrent, separate representation of organizational cli-
ents in a discrete competition for economic resources. The Agreement
structures a continuing relationship among any number of group cli-
ents and an attorney, under which many types of representation are
possible: representation of one client in one matter, of two or more
clients jointly in one matter, or of multiple clients in a planned succes-
sion of linked matters. Scenario B calls for a one-shot assessment - by
the lawyer - of the likelihood that concurrent representation might
harm one or the other client, with the possibility of presenting the
clients with the option of formally waiving any potential conflict. The
Agreement also leaves that assessment to the lawyer, but in addition
submits the project in question to an entire collective of clients, for
evaluation of whether the project as described and as carried out by
these particular players might further the aims of the group as a
whole.
So if Client A and Client B signed the Agreement, they might
expect to meet, together, with their lawyer to discuss what each could
bring to the application for the grant and whether the grant allows for
them to apply jointly. (The expectation would be the same if either
client independently discovered the opportunity to apply for the
grant.) As noted at "d"and "e" in the Agreement, this conversation
requires disclosure of information about the internal affairs of the or-
ganization that each client normally would only share privately with
Fall 20061
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its attorney. Depending on the number of clients in the Consortium at
that point, A and B could count on representatives from group Clients
C, D, E (and so on) to be present at the same meeting, to evaluate the
merits of the grant and of these clients as applicants from the perspec-
tive of the group's collective vision, and of the interests of each client
member. All the client members of the Consortium would have the
expectation that exactly just this sort of disclosure and exchange of
information would take place at group meetings, either regularly or as
needed, under the provisions marked at "c," "e" and "f." Under pro-
visions at "a" and "b," each member of the Consortium would have
contact information about all the others, to use to expand their base of
information - also something out of the ordinary for organizations that
might share nothing save their isolated attachment to a particular
attorney.
Participation in a Consortium does place certain demands on a
client group that might otherwise not be required. For example, as
described under the paragraph of the Agreement titled "Client's Ca-
pacity to Participate in the Representation" (at "g"), Clients A and B
(and C and D and E) are required to affirm, up front, that they oper-
ate as organizations at least formally accountable to their constituency
and to some articulated and therefore replicable process of meetings
and decision-making. Some attorneys might make this an implicit con-
dition of representation, by refusing to represent clients who do not
come equipped with bylaws and indicia of representativeness, but the
Consortium Agreement makes it an explicit condition of the
representation.
In return, the clients of the Consortium would receive informa-
tion from their lawyer that most clients never expect to get: who if
anyone else is paying for their representation, and what other systemic
projects the attorney is working on that might pose the problem of a
positional, as opposed to a direct, conflict. (See "k" of the Agree-
ment.) Ethics rules require self-policing, self-disclosure, and the cli-
ent's "informed consent" as to financial arrangements, and require the
lawyer to evaluate whether payment by a third party might compro-
mise the representation. 16 While disclosure to clients of other projects
does not endow them with veto power over them, it does force the
lawyer - consistent with her own duties of confidentiality to clients
outside the Consortium - to reveal work that, while not in direct tech-
nical conflict with projects of the Consortium, might compromise
them nonetheless.
So this leaves the questions: is representation of a Client Consor-
16 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(f)(2002).
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tium in community development workable? Is it desirable? Is it
ethical?
B. The Formal Ethics of Representation Within the Community
Client Consortium: Conflicts, Convening,
Constructing and Confiding
Lucie White has described how the villagers of Driefontein, a
black community in apartheid South Africa, met in open committee to
discuss which persons' problems merited the attention of the visiting
attorneys. 17 They, and their lawyers, were wholly unconcerned with
confidentiality. The residents were willing to disclose very personal
information to their neighbors, and to subordinate their individual op-
portunities for representation to the group's decision about which case
would make the greatest political impact - manifestations of openness
and self-sacrifice that exemplify the most critical qualities of the suc-
cessful social change (or any) network. Their lawyers were willing to
provide the framework within which these mutually strengthening ex-
changes could take place. The villagers and their lawyers could ap-
proach representation in this way because the villagers were wholly
unconcerned with their rights as individuals to have individualized ac-
cess to justice, and because the lawyers were wholly unconcerned with
their obligations as lawyers representing individuals to withold infor-
mation in order to preserve their clients' confidentiality.
Driefontein and common law partnerships may not seem to have
a lot in common. But White's example highlights the convergence be-
tween what political representation may require; what some thought-
ful theorists of community lawyering would like to see; more
surprisingly, what many transactional lawyers already do; and what a
conventional interpretation of American legal ethics of conflicts and
confidentiality allows. In fact, particularly in light of recent clarifica-
tions of the baseline rules of ethical conduct, one could say that the
model of client consortium created at Driefontein exemplifies what
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct contemplate as a structure
of multiple representation. In this part I will review briefly the ethical
concerns that discourage, if not prohibit, multiple representation, and
the critique of the default model of one-on-one representation as it
has been applied to groups. Then I will evaluate how the current state
of play of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and commentary
provides a framework within which the community lawyer can work
17 Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons From Driefontein on Lawyering and
Power, 1988 Wisc. L. REV. 699, 730 (describing how a committee chose cases for the
monthly visit of a team of volunteer lawyers, with preference to claims that would accus-
tom villagers to take stands against oppressive governmental action).
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within the Community Client Retainer Agreement to meet the indi-
vidual needs - and sustain the individual loyalties - of her clients as she
helps them address their collective goals.
1. Conflicts in Multiple Representation: The Concerns and the
Critique
According to one very useful typology, the justifications for the
formal rules governing conflicts of interest fall into the categories of
"instrumental" and "intrinsic." First, the rules serve the instrumental
effectiveness of representation by prohibiting the joint representation
of two parties with adverse interests. 18 Second, the rules protect the
intrinsic integrity of the client-lawyer relationship by safeguarding the
client's expectations of undivided loyalty. 19 Each rationale for con-
flicts doctrine presumes the lawyer's inability to represent her client
competently, and the client's inability to trust her lawyer, once either
breaches the strictures of the exclusive relationship. That presump-
tion is responsible for the default model: that lawyers represent one
actor (individual or entity) at a time, one "deal" at a time.
The grounding of the lawyer-client relationship in absolute undi-
vided loyalty has been criticized as promoting "radical individual-
ism"'20 or, more harshly, a rampaging "culture of zeal."121 In this
critique, the "undivided loyalty" model is a limited vision of represen-
tation as linear, serial, and confining, whether informed by rules of
ethics, conflicts and norms of undivided loyalties, or constrained by
some other boundaries of imagination. Historically, legal ethics rules
consistently have reinforced this conception of the one-on-one, exclu-
sive attorney-client relationship as the norm, and have penalized any
divergence from that conception.22 Commentators have noted that,
focused as they are on the lawyer's relationship with the individual
client, modern ethics codes provide little guidance to attorneys who
18 John S. Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of Interest, 71 TEX. L. REV. 457, 481
(1993).
19 Id. at 483.
20 Thomas Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Radical Individualism, 65 TEX. L. REV. 963, 972
(1987) (criticizing former Model Rule of Professional Conduct R.2.2 sharply, commenting
that it assumed joint representation to be an aberration from the norm of individual repre-
sentation). For further discussion of the creation and demise of Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 2.2, see notes 29-37, infra, and accompanying text).
21 Henry Ordower, Toward a Multiple Party Representative Model: Moderating Power
Disparity, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1263, 1265 (2003).
22 WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 130 (1998)(describing as "dogmatic"
the prescription that the risks of collaboration outweigh the risks of separate representa-
tion, within the context of the castigation of Louis Brandeis for attempting to represent
the interests of multiple parties to a transaction).
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represent particular kinds of client groups23 - let alone to the attorney
in the Consortium who may end up representing groups of groups.
The core of the criticism is that the standard conception of exclu-
sive representation is impractical and dysfunctional. It reflects neither
what lawyers do nor what clients want. As one researcher into the
conflicts policies of large law firms has observed, clients not only do
not fear conflicts situations, but actively seek them out:
The core precepts of fiduciary obligation, that trustees cannot
serve two masters, is intriguing, not only because real world trustees
routinely serve many masters, but also because their masters often
want them to. Indeed, the paradox of conflict of interest is that it is
at least as likely to be embraced as to be renounced. 24
Lawyers grapple with obligations to individual and group clients,
under conditions resembling multiple representation, all the time.
Typically, clients ask their lawyers to form partnerships, with every
expectation that their pre-existing relationship will continue and that
their lawyer will safeguard their interests and those of the partner-
ship. 25 In that situation, clients opt for the familiar and efficient in
continuing with their own or even their other partners' lawyer as the
lawyer for the partnership, or in choosing colleagues with like inter-
ests to form the partnership. 26 Clients in distinct cases find lawyers
with similar specialized expertise, thus augmenting the possibility of
conflict among them. 27 The fear of divided loyalty is far less compel-
ling than the faith in the known quantity, be it lawyer or co-venturer.28
The ABA acknowledged this reality when it revised the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct to permit the lawyer to act as "interme-
diary" under Model Rule 2.2,29 in joint representation of parties in a
single transaction:
23 See, e.g., Leubsdorf, supra note 8 at 827 (1992)(noting that ethics rules intended to
address the relationship of the lawyer to the individual client have been applied to the
representation of groups); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Professional Responsibility and the Close
Corporation: Toward A Realistic Ethic, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 466, 466-8 (1989) (criticizing
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for
their failure to accommodate a legal and practical reality: that lawyers deal with both the
individual members of and the entity of the close corporation itself as clients); James Gray
Pope, Two Faces, Two Ethics: Labor Union Lawyers and the Emerging Doctrine of Entity
Ethics, 68 OR. L. REV. 1 (1989)(commenting on lack of attention to the relationship of the
lawyer with unincorporated voluntary associations such as unions).
24 Susan P. Shapiro, Bushwhacking the Ethical High Road: Conflict of Interest in the
Practice of Law and Real Life, 28 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 87, 93 (2003).
25 Darius M. Ibrahim, Solving the Everyday Problem of Client Identity in the Context of
Closely Held Businesses, 56 ALA. L. REV. 181, 182 (2004).
26 Shapiro,, supra note 24 at 94.
27 Id.
28 See Ordower, supra note 21 at 1279 (stating that clients may prefer a conflicted attor-
ney to an unknown one).
29 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2 (1983).
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Rule 2.2: Intermediary
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) the lawyer consults with each client concerning the implica-
tions of the common representation, including the advantages
and risks involved, and the effect on the attorney client privi-
leges, and obtains each client's consent to the common
representation;
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be re-
solved in terms compatible with the clients' best interests, that
each client will be able to make adequately informed decisions
in the matter and that there is little risk of material prejudice to
the interests of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution
is unsuccessful; and
(3) the lawyer reasonably believes that the common represen-
tation can be undertaken impartially and without improper ef-
fect on other responsibilities the lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall consult with each
client concerning the decisions to be made and the considerations
relevant in making them, so that each client can make adequately
informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so
requests, or if any of the conditions stated in paragraph (a) is no
longer satisfied. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to
represent any of the clients in the matter that was the subject of the
intermediation.
As Hazard and Hodes noted while Rule 2.2 was in effect, the
concept of intermediation was intended to accommodate the repre-
sentation of clients with conceivably adverse interests but common
goals. 30 The new rule embodied an uneasy amalgam of Model Rules
1.6 and 1.7 (b), signifying the perception that multiple representation
was presumptively conflicted, with the lawyer assuming the presump-
tively impossible task of loyally serving all interests, and of keeping all
confidences. 31 Given the perspective that no lawyer could possibly ap-
ply undivided devotion to more than one client at one time, the for-
mulation of Model Rule 2.2 substituted "impartiality" for "loyalty, '32
requiring the lawyer to "reasonably believe that the common repre-
sentation can be undertaken impartially (underlining mine). . . .,33
The revision proved unsatisfactory, failing to transcend its origins in
30 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, 1 THE LAW OF LAWYERINO 512
(1993 ed., 1998 Supp.).
31 Id. at 511.
32 For a discussion of this point, see John S. Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries:
The Representation of Multiple Clients In the Modern Legal Profession, 1992 U. ILL.L.REV
741, 802.
33 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2(a)(3)(1983).
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the "radical individualism" of conflicts doctrine.34 It forced the lawyer
into the drastic remedy of withdrawal from the representation of all
the clients in the group (including former individual clients) if any one
client requested it or if any unforeseen factor threatened to throw off
the delicate balance of individual interests. 35 That and other difficul-
ties with the doctrine led the Reporter for the Ethics 2000 Commis-
sion to recommend the elimination of Model Rule 2.2 in favor of
further annotation of the less rigid conflicts rules under Model Rule
1.7.36 One reason given for the elimination of Model Rule 2.2 was
that it was no longer needed: that lawyers had become accustomed to
multiple representation, and were in fact monitoring their representa-
tion under the more forgiving provisions of the other rule.37
With the dust settled, it is instructive to note what is left of "inter-
mediation." The concept, with all its anxieties about loyalty and confi-
dences, has been folded into the Comments to revised Model Rule
1.7(b), under the delineation of "common representation. ' 38 The new
Rule allows multiple representation after consultation with the clients
and with their consent, confirmed in writing.39 The text omits from
the Rule itself the "nuclear option" of forced withdrawal from repre-
sentation of any client in the joint matter if any one client objects or if
the lawyer's self-guarantees of impartiality and equal benefit to all cli-
ents fail. Instead, the drafters recast the ultimatum, in the Comments,
34 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, 1 THE LAW OF LAWYERING,
§11.14, pp. 11-40 (3d ed., 2004 Supp.)(commenting that multiple representation's perceived
departure from the norm of undivided loyalty to one client made the drafters so nervous
that they "freighted" Rule 2.2 with restrictions that made it unattractive to use).
35 See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 2.2(c) (1983), supra note 29 and accompanying
text; see also Nancy J. Moore, Restating the Law of Lawyer Conflicts, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHics 541,553 (1997)(that consequences of withdrawal under Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct R. 2.2 - that the lawyer cannot represent any of the parties again - were
more severe than those of withdrawal under the contemporaneous version of Model Rules
of Professional Conduct R. 1.7, in which client consent could cure the conflict or allow
representation of one party).
36 See Center for Professional Responsibility, Ethics 2000 Commission Draft for Public
Comment, Model Rule 2.2 - Reporter's Explanation of Changes (March 23, 1999): "The
Commission recommends deleting Rule 2.2 and moving any discussion of joint representa-
tion to the Rule 1.7 Comment." See also American Bar Association, Report to the House
of Delegates, Model Rule 2.2, Reporter's Explanation of Changes (No. 401, Feb.2002).
37 Center for Professional Responsibility, supra note 36; see also Moore, supra note 35
at 554 (commenting that, in practice, lawyers ignored Model Rule 2.2, and treated joint
representation as though it were governed by the more flexible terms of Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, R. 1.7).
38 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.1.7(b), cmts. 26-33 (2002).
39 Id. at R.1.7(b)(4). See also id. at R.1.7(b)(2)(2002)(stating that the concurrent repre-
sentation must be permissible under other law); id. at R. 1.7(b)(3)(stating that the repre-
sentation cannot pit the two clients against each other in the same action, in the same
tribunal).
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as a caution.40 As with previous formulations of the rules of conflicts,
the litmus test is not the clients' perception of whether their lawyer's
loyalty to each of them will be challenged, but the lawyer's perception
of her ability ". . .to provide competent and diligent representation to
each affected client."'41
The revised Model Rules remind the lawyer that she must main-
tain her position as ". . .impartial between commonly represented cli-
ents. . ." as a condition of continuing representation. 42 Most critically
for the lawyer in the Consortium (and for the clients deciding whether
to join the Consortium), the commentary retains the key principle that
the lawyer for joint clients must discard her unambiguous loyalty for a
more balanced approach, with certain unavoidable consequences for
the client-lawyer relationship:
... When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between cli-
ents, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that
of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances, and, thus,
that the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for
decisions than when each client is separately represented. 43
The excerpt posits an interesting equation in the traditional law-
yer-client relationship: that between partisanship and dependency.
That correlation derives from the discretion placed in the lawyer to
monitor her own impartiality. "Impartiality," the model of undivided
loyalty, and the requirement that the lawyer keep each client in-
formed 44 squeeze the lawyer in joint representation into the position
of satisfying each client that she knows enough about every other cli-
ent's business to proceed knowledgeably, and that the lawyer is keep-
ing her confidences close. 45 The presumed precariousness of the
lawyer's position on that tight rope is what led the drafters of Model
Rule 2.2 to see withdrawal as the almost inevitable outcome of multi-
ple representation.
Under old and new formulations of multiple representation, the
Rules essentially warn, "let the client beware." The lawyer judges
whether she is being fair to each and fair to all; she decides whether
the welfare of the deal or the collaborative requires her to disseminate
40 Id. at R. 1.7, cmt. 29 ("Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from repre-
senting all the clients if the common representation fails.").
41 Id. at 1.7(b)(1).
42 Id. at R.1.7, cmt. 29.
43 Id. at R. 1.7, cmt. 32 (2002); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2, cmt.
9 (1983).
44 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2002)("A lawyer shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.").
45 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2, cmt. 6 (citing Rules 1.4 and 1.6).
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information given to her by each participant. The only check which
the client retains is the decision to label critical information as confi-
dential and then force the lawyer to withold it. The implication is that
the traditional relationship allows the client to place unthinking trust
in her lawyer. In contrast, under multiple representation the client
must maintain vigilance, either because the lawyer cannot possibly be
paying close enough attention to her interests, or worse, because be-
hind the scenes the lawyer is balancing off the interests of other clients
against her own.
In sum, the revoked and the current Rules governing multiple
representation warn the lawyer to alert her collective clients to one of
many dangers in the divergence from the conventional one-on-one re-
lationship: that they may have to do more thinking for themselves.
One could argue that, rather than some second-best form of represen-
tation, representation of a network or consortium of individuals or
groups achieves what "rebellious lawyering" 46 strives for: clients "as-
suming greater responsibility for decisions." That the Model Rules
seem to view this as cautionary, rather than celebratory, does not
mean that the community lawyer cannot take great satisfaction in it.
Here, the lawyer need not see the ethical rules as problematic. What
the rules require is what clients who willingly enter into a Client Con-
sortium expect, and welcome.
2. The Consortium and Client Conflicts: The Protections
Inherent in Convening
The Community Client Retainer Agreement informs the client
that the Consortium's lawyer will engage in at least three major activi-
ties that might compromise the traditional conception of the exclusive
client-lawyer relationship: convening the members; circulating infor-
mation among (and possibly about) them; and representing the mem-
bers of the network singly, jointly (perhaps as parties to the same
transaction) or as a whole, possibly in advocacy positions. Each of
these triggers specific ethical issues, all relating to the possibility of
direct or positional conflicts and to the control of clients' confidences.
The focus of the Consortium on "convening" is designed to miti-
gate the meltdown which the Rules anticipate under a multiple repre-
sentation. The single greatest benefit of the Consortium is that it
allows the lawyer and her clients to stop guessing about what the in-
terests of the lawyer's separate clients are, and about whether they
support or detract from each other. The Consortium's purpose is to
46 See GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PRO-
GRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992).
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provide the forum through which potential conflicts can be brought to
the surface, discussed, and either minimized or acknowledged as insu-
perable. Under the "Retainer Agreement," the prospective "Commu-
nity Client" agrees to submit projects for review by the other
members before they become the subject of the lawyer's representa-
tion. 47 The Retainer addresses in advance the feared possibility that
consensus on any one project may be unachievable, warning of the
possibility either that the client members may decide that they cannot
achieve their respective goals through multiple representation, or that
the refusal of any one to release information to the Consortium may
jettison that project. 48
The difference between the treatment of potential conflicts antici-
pated under the Rules and of those anticipated under the Retainer is
that under the Rules, it is the lawyer who assesses whether the divi-
siveness impairs her impartiality; under the Retainer, it is the clients in
the Consortium who assess whether the apparent divisiveness is un-
resolvable. As the Rules anticipate, the clients will assume the respon-
sibility themselves for deciding whether the multiple representation
compromises their individual goals. The decision-making processes to
which the client agrees under the "Retainer" constitute the adoption
of an advance waiver, with nuances.49 The discussions within the Con-
sortium are designed to address the possibility of conflict project by
project, for participating and non-participating members. The individ-
ual client member of the Consortium signs on, in advance, to a process
within which potential conflicts will be discussed and the members
collectively will decide who gets the direct benefit of the
representation.
The greatest advantage to individual clients of membership in the
Consortium is the forum it provides for airing information about the
conflicts about which formal ethics rules have been the least restric-
tive, but through which the members could come to greatest harm:
"economic" and "positional" conflicts. On balance, formal ethical
rules allow Scenarios A and B, as long as they are conceptualized
solely as the simultaneous representation of competing, though not
directly opposing, economic claims; and as long as attorneys take pre-
cautions to alert clients of the problems if the outcome of any multiple
representation can only be fashioned as a "zero-sum. ' 50 Somewhat
47 See "Community Client Retainer Agreement," supra Part III, 2.b.
48 Id. 4. For discussion of the effect of divulging confidential client information to
other clients in a multiple representation, see Part IV. B. 3. , infra.
49 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-436 (2005)(re-
voking Formal Opinion 93-327's blanket prohibition on advance waiver of conflicts).
50 See Donoghue, supra note 3; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibil-
ity, Formal Op. 06-438 (2006) (explaining the requirements under Model Rule of Profes-
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less clearly, formal rules do not automatically prohibit lawyers from
engaging in representation that creates "positional conflicts," such as
espousing opposing views before different legislative bodies or even
before different tribunals in unrelated proceedings. 51 But that lack of
prohibition does not give the community lawyer free rein to risk un-
dermining her clients' trust by lobbying for legislation that assists one
client but is opposed by another, or, more subtly, to create "negotiat-
ing precedent" in deals between some clients and third parties that
may affect the subsequent chances of other clients to win favorable
terms.5 2
The Client Consortium exists to promote the kind of communica-
tion that can work out "positional conflicts" before they happen, and
thus to support the "intrinsic" justifications for sensitivity to conflicts
among clients. More likely than danger from opposing positions in re-
lated court cases, clients in a Community Consortium will face the
possibility that their lawyer may be involved in some law reform or
institutional activity that in the long term could compromise the cli-
ents' individual or collective missions.53 While some have emphasized
that communities are not "monolithic" - that no one position will ever
capture their diverse desires and needs, and that thus the lawyer may
safely represent the many viewpoints contained within5 4 - only
through engagement with a network of clients can a lawyer educate
herself in the complexity of opinion and thus the complexity of
representation.
sional Conduct 1.8(g)(2002) that lawyers disclose to multiple clients fully all information
concerning settlements throughout the representation, and secure their consent in writing
to the multiple representation).
51 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt.24 (2002); see also ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op.93-377 (1993)(under previous version of
Model Rule 1.7, requiring the lawyer to evaluate the risks of undermining either client's
representation even if two matters will not be litigated in the same jurisdiction);
Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of Interest, supra note 18 at 474.
52 See Dzienkowski, supra note 18 at 503 on "negotiating precedent." I received my
hard lesson in "positional conflicts" when my clinic represented at a zoning board hearing
a neighborhood association opposed to the construction in its vicinity of a privately-owned
prison. Present at the hearing was a small business owner, for whom the clinic had done
work in the past but for whom it had no active matter pending. She was very much inter-
ested in the prison's application, because supporters had approached her with a proposal
for a business venture on the grounds. She was completely cordial, and laughed that we
were on the opposite side - but though no concrete damage or malpractice had occurred,
much ill will could have ensued.
53 See, e.g., D.C. Bar Op. 265 (1996)(addressing whether a lawyer's potential role as
general counsel for an association of foster parents and probable involvement in policy
matters on its behalf might compromise the individual stances that she could take on be-
half of individual client children in foster care or individual client foster care parents).
54 Peter Margulies, Multiple Communities or Monolithic Clients: Positional Conflicts of
Interest and the Mission of the Legal Services Lawyer, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2348-9
(1999).
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3. Constructing and Confiding: Intimacy and the Hazards and
Benefits of Exchanging Information
As I will describe later, lawyers in transactional work routinely
engage with their clients in the act of "constructing. '55 As the "con-
vener" of the Consortium, the lawyer for the Consortium pulls to-
gether existing clients, or adds new ones, with the expectation that the
members will benefit from sharing expertise and information. She is in
the perfect position to do so; she may have helped some of her clients
constitute themselves to begin with. Having created their governance
structure, or perhaps advised on the composition of their boards, she
knows a great deal about their financial circumstances, their strengths
and their weaknesses - particularly if she assisted them with applica-
tions for government grants, or, in the case of nonprofits, for federal
or state recognition of tax exempt status.56 Sometimes she knows
more about them than they know about themselves. Her knowledge
equips her to make mutually advantageous matches of complemen-
tary strengths, to avoid dangerous pairings that would exacerbate
weaknesses, and to mass the resources of the group for collective
action.
Ethics opinions and cases do not seem to address the scenario in
which a lawyer uses her superior knowledge of her own separate cli-
ents' strengths specifically to bring clients together. Commentary on
the Model Rules assumes that, in the context of the creation of a part-
nership, the clients initiate the contact; specifically, it is the clients
who come independently to the lawyer, untainted by prior dealings
with her.57 But it is precisely that prior knowledge - that omniscience -
that establishes the lawyer's value as a convener. Under both revoked
Rule 2.2 and current formulations under 1.7, a lawyer can only re-
present multiple parties in the same transaction if she knows enough
about them to determine whether joint representation would be
equally advantageous to all and risk adverse effects to none. 58
The lawyer's knowledge about her clients may constitute one of
the Consortium's greatest strengths; it may also contain the predicate
to its destruction. Clients who enter into networks - whether they are
55 For an analysis of the lawyer as enhancer of "social capital" through her role as
architect of the governing structures of group clients, see Part VI, infra.
56 See, e.g., IRS Form 1023, Application for Recognition of Exemption (2005)(requir-
ing information on revenues and sources of funds, expenditures, fund-raising and
programmatic activities, and board composition).
57 See HAZARD JR. & HODES, (3d ed., 2004 Supp.) supra note 34 at 11-43, illus.li-li
(positing how the lawyer could conform to Model Rule 1.7 in forming a partnership among
A, B, and C).
58 See SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 22 at 130; see also MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2(a)(2), supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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referred to as partnerships, close corporations, or consortia - take
risks with information. As I will discuss below, for networks to achieve
their purpose of enhancing advantage to all members through disclo-
sure of information about each, the members must divulge secrets
about their own weaknesses.59 The lawyer must distribute informa-
tion she knows about each client member of the network, not only
because it is information that might be mutually useful, but because
ethics rules governing common representation require her to handle
information in a way befitting her "equal duty of loyalty to each cli-
ent. ' 60 The legal risks may be less obvious, but common law and ethi-
cal rules make much of them: under new rules and old, members of
any client network must understand that they are foregoing any claims
in litigation of privilege for their joint communications to each other
and to their lawyer.61 While under the liberalized rules clients can
waive their "concurrent" conflicts in advance, they cannot so easily be
asked to give up their guarantees of confidentiality. 62 It is the pros-
pect that any one client in a multiple representation may refuse to
divulge information critical to the project, not the possibility of any
substantive conflict, that may compromise the future of the Consor-
tium irreparably.63
The Client Consortium Retainer warns the prospective client
about the probability that information about its own "business" may
be disclosed for the good of the order - and that it is possible that the
client, or any other client of the Consortium, may refuse to consent to
such disclosure.64 Since advance waiver of confidentiality is impermis-
sible, the lawyer must return to her community client for approval
each time she thinks that she needs to disclose to the entire group
59 For an overview of network and structural hole theory, and of the lawyer's potential
role as "structural hole manager," see Part VI.B., infra.
60 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7, cmt. 31 (2002): "As to the duty of
confidentiality, continued representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client
asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other lawyer information relevant to the common
representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client,
and each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that
might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that
information to that client's benefit."
61 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2002), cmt. 30 (reminding the lawyer
to remind her clients of the common law rule that privilege does not attach among com-
monly represented clients).
62 See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-436, n.6 (2005)
(retaining the prohibition on advance waiver of confidentiality).
63 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.7, cmt. 31(advising the lawyer to inform
clients in a multiple representation at the outset that any one client's refusal to divulge
critical information will result in the lawyer's withdrawal).
64 See "Community Client Retainer Agreement," Part III, infra, at internal notes "c"
and "i."
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something about that client's affairs, or about the make-up of that
group client itself. For example, if under Scenario B, clients A and B,
now members of the Client Consortium, wished to apply jointly for
that grant, the lawyer might feel compelled not only to bring the mat-
ter of their application up before the entire Client Consortium for ap-
proval, but to disclose the organizational weaknesses about Client B
that initially had caused her concern. If Client B refused the lawyer's
entreaties for permission to do so, the lawyer would face the quintes-
sential ethical conundrum of being required to disclose this arguably
relevant information to all, and to refrain from disclosing what any
one client may decline to have disclosed.
One possible solution to the dilemma is to leave disclosure up to
the members of the Consortium. In their quarterly group meetings or
in other conversations, they can decide to disclose information to each
other directly, or to demand disclosure from each other. In short,
since "confidentiality" is an issue between lawyer and client, but not
between client and client, the clients in the Consortium can decide to
bypass their lawyer completely. But avoiding the lawyer will only
work for so long. That the client group must always feel free to "con-
fide" in its lawyer lies at the heart of the "intrinsic" justifications for
conflicts rules.
The lawyer caught between her contradictory duties to disclose
and withold information within the Consortium faces the same quan-
dary as does the lawyer for a partnership. The law of partnerships
requires the lawyer for a partnership to disclose one member's infor-
mation to all for the good of the order.65 That obligation is reflected
in Model Rule 1.13, which requires the lawyer to assume an identity of
interest between the group and its constituent individuals and to treat
the organization, and not its members, as her client.66 But the pre-
sumption that a partnership, or even an unincorporated association, is
to be treated as an entity without regard for the individual members'
concerns about confidentiality, is not absolute. As Simon and others
have noted, under the "aggregate theory" of partnerships and unin-
corporated associations, the lawyer's representation of the constitu-
ents of those organizations is considered to be continuing, based in
part on the constituents' expectations that the lawyer continues to re-
65 See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361
(1991)(interpreting Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 as requiring a lawyer who
represents a partnership to divulge to other partners information received from an individ-
ual partner, if it relates to the interests of the partnership).
66 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13, cmt.1 (2004); see also D.C. Ethics
Op. 216 (1991) (commenting that usually the lawyer must deem the corporation, and not
one of its principals or constituents, to be her client).
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present both their and the organization's interests.67 Even under "en-
tity theory," attorneys can represent both an individual member of an
organization and the organization, if the matters are disparate or if
both the member and the organization consent to the representa-
tion.68 Lawyers who represent close corporations also may find them-
selves in the position of simultaneously advocating for the interests of
both the entity and its constituent individuals. 69
An "aggregate" theory of representation may be exactly what the
clients committed to a Consortium want. Client organizations that are
willing to share their decision-making and even pool their resources
with other clients will do so for both mutual and self interest, in the
hope that the success of the collaborative will buoy every member.
These clients may hold subtler expectations of the client-lawyer rela-
tionship than those contemplated by the ,standard conception: they
may find it desirable that their lawyer is mindful of their collective and
particular goals. Seen from that perspective, the presumed clash be-
tween the lawyer as champion of the unitary client group and as
guardian of its constituents seems less like a fight, and more like crea-
tive tension.
C. Lingering Questions: Can the Lawyer Force Her Clients to Play
Well With Each Other as a Condition of Representation?
Can lawyers ethically require clients to "play well with others" in
a Client Consortium as a condition of representation? The question
combines two concerns: can lawyers require client behaviors as condi-
tions of representation; and can that behavior consist of collaboration
within the representation?
A colleague of mine has described how he used to set the terms
of representation for cash-strapped community groups that sought his
67 See Ibrahim, supra note 25 at 186 (comparing the entity and aggregate theories of
corporate representation); see also Simon, Whom Does the Organization's Lawyer Re-
present? supra note 7 at 69-70 (referring to decisions which treat representation in small
corporations as multiple representations, under the assumption that the constituents' fre-
quent, informal relationships with each other may lead them to expect that their lawyer
will continue to represent their own and their entity's interests seamlessly and fairly).
68 See A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-361, supra
note 65 (noting circumstances under which lawyer may continue to represent the interests
of an individual partner, even though the lawyer for a partnership is presumed to re-
present the partnership as an entity); see also, Ernest T. Lindberg, Speaking of Ethics:
Representation of Trade Associations, WASH. LAW. 10,11(Feb. 2002)(noting that, if there is
any possibility that the member's and trade association's interests may be adverse, an at-
torney may represent an individual member of a trade association only if both the member
and trade association consent).
69 Mitchell, supra note 23 at 506-8 (advocating for the lawyer's responsibility towards
each member of the corporation as well as to the entity, and developing a "typology" of
situations under which multiple representation is ethically possible).
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help in incorporating and in securing status as tax exempt organiza-
tions. One option he offered was to charge a fee, and take care of all
the paperwork himself, with minimal involvement on the part of the
group's members. The other option was for the members to meet with
him regularly for guidance; and draft their own mission statement,
corporate charter, and by-laws for his legal review; and, again with his
oversight, fill out the application for tax exemption themselves. As he
would tell them, the only fee for option two was his invitation to the
barbecue they would hold once their organization was chartered and
won tax exemption. No doubt, option two consumed more of his and
his client's time. Yet it achieved his real goal of the representation - to
build the group's capacity by engaging it in a process of self-
definition. 70
My colleague's example, and my conception of the Consortium,
stop short of exacting some sort of outward-looking action on the part
of their clients as a condition of representation. Other examples exist
in the literature of lawyers who do: the Workplace Project on Long
Island,71 and the use of Time Dollars in Washington D.C.,72 come to
mind. Clearly these conditions express the lawyer's view as to the po-
litical significance of representation and of legal action. Engaging in
community action or mentoring other clients may amount to a not-so-
hidden price exacted by the "free" lawyer, an exercise of her ideology
that she might feel less free to impose on a paying client, and an ex-
ploitation of her status in the legal services market as a scarce re-
source. The objection is legitimate, but there are several responses to
it.
First, in some cities it is possible that community groups are not
stuck in a "no exit" relationship with the only available lawyer in
town. Community groups have access to a greater range of legal ser-
vices for representation in community development projects than ever
before. Even before the Legal Services Corporation relaxed its restric-
tions on the representation of groups,73 a number of legal services of-
70 My thanks to my colleague at the Washington College of Law, Professor Perry Wal-
lace, for sharing this anecdote a number of years ago.
71 See Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, The Work-
place Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.REv. 408, 444
(1995)(requiring immigrant workers, in order to receive free legal services, to sign contract
obligating them to active involvement in systemic reform work and legal education about
workers' rights, including taking a course and joining an action committee).
72 See Edgar S. Cahn, Law and Justice: Co-Production as the New Imperative, 1997
ANN. SURV. AM. L.747, 751 (describing several examples in which legal services providers
in the District of Columbia - one a law school clinic, another a major private law firm -
required their clients to pay their fees in "time dollars," or hours of community service).
73 See Legal Services Corporation, Financial Eligibility - Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg.
45545,45564 (Aug. 8, 2005) (amending 45 C.F.R. §1611.6 to allow recipients of LSC funds
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fices have engaged for some time in some kind of transactional,
community development work.74 Some fifty law school clinics in the
United States represent community organizations in affordable hous-
ing, economic development or small business practices. 75 A number
of state and local bar associations have inaugurated programs to en-
gage commercial law firms in pro bono representation of community
organizations and small businesses. 76 So in some venues a neighbor-
hood association or a non profit can in fact walk if its prospective free
lawyer proposes conditions for representation that seem too onerous.
Second, as these few examples illustrate, exacting a condition (as
distinct from a price) for representation is nothing new. Exacting a
condition of agreement to collaboration for representation is some-
thing different. If the condition is to be client-centered, not coercive,
the lawyer has to communicate frankly with the prospective Commu-
nity Client about two concerns. First, the lawyer must feel certain, and
must be able to advise her client, that joining the Consortium will not
compromise the client's duties to its own constituency. For the lawyer
who assisted any one of her client groups in "constructing" itself to
to represent groups or entities that lack means to hire private counsel, and that either are
composed of or provide services to low income individuals). The version of the regulation
that had been in place since 1983 had limited representation to groups primarily composed
of members who were financially eligible for services. Id. at 45556.
74 At this time neither the Legal Services Corporation nor the National Economic De-
velopment and Law Center keeps a roster of the federally funded legal services offices that
engage in community development work. E-mail from Brad J. Caftel, Vice President and
General Counsel, National Economic Development and Law Center, to Susan D. Bennett,
Professor of Law, Washington College of Law (Aug. 27, 2005) (on file with author); tele-
phone interview with John C. Eidleman, Senior Program Counsel, Legal Services Corpora-
tion, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 9, 2005). For a recent description of the community
development work that neighborhood-based legal services offices do, see Brad J. Caftel,
The Relationship between Lawyers and Low Income Communities, 37 J. PovERTY L. &
POL'Y 129 (2003).
75 Similarly, no one, easily accessible roster exists of law school clinics that engage in
some form of transactional, group, or community representation; the figure is the author's
estimate. See Gateway to Clinical Legal Education, http://cgiz.www.law.umich.edu/
GCLE/Index.asp.
76 See, e.g., Terry Carter, Grassroots Growth, A.B.A. J. 25 (Nov. 2000)(describing state
and local bar association programs that link private firms with community organizations);
Jennifer L. Henderson, MVLS Launches Program to Benefit Small Nonprofits, MD. B.
BULL. 5 (April 2002)(describing the Maryland Volunteer Lawyers' Service's Community
Development Project, which finds attorneys to represent non-profit organizations that
serve low income communities); Hope Winer Sanborn, Transaction Action: Pro Bono Ser-
vice Isn't Always Synonymous with Litigation, A.B.A. J. 30 (Sept.2005)(noting that the
ABA Business Law Section supports over thirty transactional pro bono projects); Maureen
Thornton Syracuse, D.C.Bar Pro Bono Program: Thank You For Your Support, WASH.
LAW. 37 (April, 2002)(describing the efforts of the Community Economic Development
Pro Bono Project of the District of Columbia Bar Pro Bono Program, which at the time of
writing had placed 28 community organizations with 25 law firms as house counsel, and
found firms to represent 77 small nonprofits and small businesses in discrete matters).
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serve as a responsible fiduciary to its members and mission, the notion
of requiring the group to distribute confidential information and to
forego opportunities must give pause. Directors are bound generally
to act in "good faith" and in the best interests of the organization. 77
More specifically, duties of loyalty and care impose on the corporate
board an obligation to keep close all information about its affairs. 78
Even if the community client is an unincorporated association, bound
by purely moral and not by legal duty, the lawyer would wish to en-
courage it to act in a way likely to earn and keep its constituents' trust.
That trust might be undercut if the client's members thought that its
leaders were spilling word about its business out on the street, and
that they were bowing out of projects and sources of revenue that
could move the organization forward.
The Community Client Retainer guards procedurally against the
possibility that the Client may act against its constituents' wishes, or
what its constituents interpret to be its mission. The Retainer requires
each Consortium Client to guarantee that it governs itself under inter-
nal institutional rules that promote openness throughout the organiza-
tion, and that allow for decisions to be made by the group.79 That
requirement serves as the lawyer's assurance that her client's deci-
sions, including consent to any conflict, are fully informed and deliber-
ated, and that the client is articulating the substance of the decisions
to her accurately. 80
By-laws or organizational rules - even assuming they are followed
- alone of course will not save a client from arriving, after full trans-
parency and thorough debate, at an institutionally disastrous decision
to share information and renounce business opportunities. But it is
just as likely that the community client's decision to foresake immedi-
ate advantage for a common good will support both the client's fiduci-
ary duties and its organizational health. For the segment of the
community development client population rooted in the non-profit
sector, representation that fosters synergy of resources and connection
with community in return for the potential sacrifice of immediate indi-
vidual advantage may fit well with the dual mission of doing good and
77 See, e.g., REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS ACT, § 8.30 (1987) : "(a) A
director shall discharge his or her duties as a director, including his or her duties as a
member of a committee: 1. (1) in good faith;(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person
in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner the
director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation."
78 A.B.A. COMMITIEE ON NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS, GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS
OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 34 (2d ed 2002).
79 See "Community Client Retainer Agreement," Part III, infra, at internal note "g."
80 See, e.g., Michael J. Fox, Some Rules for Community Lawyers, CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. (May, 1980) at 3 (recommending that the lawyer for community groups insist that the
group adopt a process by which it directs its lawyer with a unified voice).
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doing well. More mature community-based organizations, those in a
position to apply for and receive recognition of federal tax exempt
status, know what the tax code imposes in return for tax exemption:
an organization must conform its mission, limit its lobbying, eliminate
its partisan political activity and vary its funding sources in order to
receive the benefit."' Grantors take collaboration of neighborhood
based groups in projects as a given, and exact it as a prerequisite.8 2
While the community lawyer's role certainly is not synonymous
with that of the IRS or of that of potential funders, for clients to col-
laborate on a long term perspective for the enhancement of their indi-
vidual and mutual capability to effect social change may not be such a
stretch beyond what some already do, when they collaborate infor-
mally to achieve more immediate, targeted goals. It is also what the
social theory of groups and observation of the efficacy of groups in
neighborhoods suggest that they must do. In the next part, I will de-
scribe the "sociology of neighboring" and suggest how it supports the
need for groups to disclose confidences, share resources, and generally
re-conceptualize their parochial interests in terms of group benefit.
V. "BRIDGE" OR "GLUE, " "LEVERAGE" OR "SUPPORT":
COMMUNITY CLIENTS AND THE NECESSITY OF NETWORKS
A. Getting Ahead and Getting By: The Different Kinds
of Social Capital
Seen through the lawyer's lens, the "Community Client Consor-
tium" may generate multiple representation, "intermediation," or "fa-
cilitation." Seen through the perspective of the sociologist, the
Consortium generates the opportunity for the development of both a
network, and of a kind of "social capital" (a benefit derived from
membership in a network). Community groups have everything to
gain from linking with peer groups inside their sphere, even though
similarly situated and constituted organizations might well consider
themselves more as natural competitors than as colleagues, and with
resource-rich allies outside. Although social capital theory and the
other theories enfolded within the "sociology of neighboring" all dif-
fer slightly, all address how multiple, repeated interactions among in-
dividuals in rich and poor communities build intangible reserves of
81 See WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT:
LAW, BUSINESS & THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY 169-173 (2001)(in one example, describing
how, in order to insure that tax exempt public charities" escape control by a few contribu-
tors, the statute and regulations governing tax exemption require that organizations
demonstrate a broad base of public contribution).
82 Jane Hexter, Got Collaboration? http://Charitychannel.com/publish/templates/?a=
62638z=0 (last visited Aug.15, 2005).
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solidarity that can lead to civic engagement and political action. A
discussion of the construction and operation of the concept of social
capital allows for a fuller evaluation of whether a "Community Client
Consortium" might serve the needs of individual clients and of clients
as collaborators in the promotion of social change.
Depending on who you ask, "social capital" has a long history.8 3
It enjoys recent prominence in sociological theory8 4 and as a force
driving community development research and policy.8 5 Extracted
somewhat confusingly over time from diverse analyses of the impacts
of social relationships on economic behavior,86 "social capital" has
been described both as a process and as a product, as the creation of
the network of contacts that generates information and trust, and as
the benefits themselves - both as what it is and as what it does.87 Its
malleability has made it attractive as an all-purpose explanation for all
kinds of social problems, and for prescribing all kinds of programs as
83 Robert Putnam attributes the first use, in 1916, of the term "social capital" to L.J.
Hanifan, state supervisor of rural schools in West Virginia. ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING
ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000)( "... those
tangible assets [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely good will, fellow-
ship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a
social unit .. " citing L. J. HANIFAN, THE COMMUNITY CENTER 78 (1920)); see PUTNAM,
BOWLING ALONE, id. at 445-6, notel2 for a further, brief history of the term. For other
historical review, see Michael Woolcock, Social capital and economic development: Toward
a theoretical synthesis and policy framework, 27 THEORY & Soc. 151, 192 n.13 (1998)(cred-
iting the coinage of "social capital" to Jane Jacobs, citing JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND
LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 138 (1961)).
84 See Robert D. Putnam, Preface to Symposium: Using Social Capital to Help Integrate
Planning Theory, Research and Practice, 70 J. AM. PLAN. ASs'N.142 (2004)(assessing the
wide currency of social capital theory as "conceptual platform" for multidisciplinary ex-
change); James DeFilippis, The Myth of Social Capital in Community Development, 12
HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 781, at 781 (2001)(noting the dominance of "social capital" as the
organizing theme for the 1999 meeting of the Urban Affairs Association as an indicator
that ". . .social capital had, in only about half a decade, become one of the principal con-
cerns of community development practitioners and researchers.").
85 Steven N. Durlauf, The case "against" social capital, 20 Focus 1, at 1 (1999)(citing
the "current boomlet in policy and academic circles for social capital"); see also Woolcock,
supra note 83 at 193-6, n.20, for an exhaustive catalogue of research into the effect of
"social capital" in a number of substantive areas.
86 For an overview of the development of social capital theory, see Ivan Light, Social
Capital's Unique Accessibility, 70 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 141,145 (2004); Woolcock, supra
note 83 at 159-167 (locating the roots of "social capital" in eighteenth century discussions
of how social institutions and social relationships affect market exchange, discussions
which re-surfaced early in the twentieth century with the emergence of sociology in the
American academy as a distinct discipline, and at mid-century and later with new emphasis
on studies of entrepreneurship and comparative institutions).
87 See Ross GITITELL & AvIs VIDAL, COMMUNITY ORGANIZING: BUILDING SOCIAL
CAPITAL AS A DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 16, fig. 2.1 (1998) (charting features of "social
capital" as described by several influential current exponents); Alan Kay, Social capital, the
social economy and community development, 41 COMM.DEV.J.160, 162 (2006)(summarizing
major schools of thought about social capital).
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solutions.88
Contemporary definitions of "social capital" focus on a few key
points. James Coleman distinguished "human capital," the lode of
skills that expands the individual's capacity for action, from "social
capital," the acquisition and adjustments of relationships between in-
dividuals, within which one exercises and acquires "human capital. '89
Coleman described exchanges between individuals as generating
"credit slips,"90 intangible bonds of obligation that create expectations
of what Robert Putnam has described as "generalized reciprocity," a
favor done with no thought to immediate return, but some faith of an
answering action in the long run.91 Expanding on the metaphor of
mercantile exchange, others have described social capital as ".. .stocks
of social trust, norms and networks that people can draw upon in or-
der to solve common problems. ' 92 Ronald Burt has explained social
capital as the bond created through a process of exchanging informa-
tion.93 In sum, social capital is the product of those "credit slips," the
accretion of connections built through patterns of reciprocal action,
and the trust in the eventual fulfillment of the promise of some return
for your individual good deed.
Social capital theory became relevant to the study of economic
isolation and social exclusion when its proponents folded in Mark
Granovetter's thesis about the operation of "weak ties," the connec-
tions outside one's immediate circle of family, friends and neighbors
that prove to be the most effective in securing the means to long-term
advancement and security, such as employment or higher education. 94
"Weak ties" have been recast in the context of social capital theory as
"bridging capital" or "social leverage," and are contrasted with
88 Woolcock, supra note 83 at 156-7; see also Xavier de Souza Briggs, Social Capital:
Easy Beauty or Meaningful Pleasure? 70 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 141, 151(2004)(ascribing to
social capital theory the quality of "easy beauty," John Dewey's coinage to describe a the-
ory that is so immediately satisfying and pleasing that no one bothers to analyze what it
means or what it does).
89 James S. Coleman, Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital, 94 AM. J. Soc.
S95, S100 (1988).
90 Id at S102.
91 PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE, supra note 83 at 134.
92 Robert E. Lang & Stephen P. Homburg, What Is Social Capital and Why Is It Impor-
tant to Public Policy? 9 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 1, 4 (1998).
93 Ronald S. Burt, The Gender of Social Capital 10 RATIONALITY & Soc. 5, 30 (1998).
94 Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties Hypothesis, 78 AM. J. Soc. 1360
(1973). For a more recent expansion of the "weak ties hypothesis," see BENNEIT HARRI-
SON & MARCUS WEISS, WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT NETWORKS: COMMUNITY-BASED OR-
GANIZATIONS AND REGIONAL ALLIANCES 37 (1998) (that widely distributed "weak ties" to
strangers, as opposed to the "strong ties" to family and close friends, may produce more
leads to jobs).
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"glue," "bonding" or "coping capital," or "social support. ' 95 To illus-
trate:"bridges/bridging capital" or "social leverage" is the result of the
relationship with your guidance counselor, or with Joe's cousin the
office manager who gets your foot in the door of the right college or
job. "Glue" or "bonding/coping capital" is the result of the relation-
ship you have with your cousin, who will babysit for you on short no-
tice, or your neighbor, who will lend you a cup of sugar. The
difference has been summarized as between what "gets you ahead"
and what "gets you by."96
"Glue" in some respects resembles "capacity, ' 97 or "collective ef-
ficacy," the cohesion and trust resulting from relationships within a
relatively homogeneous group that enable the group to achieve a cer-
tain amount, but only within a limited sphere of action.98 In contrast,
"bridging capital" grows from relationships between dissimilar indi-
viduals, and also between dissimilar groups, that enable individuals
and groups to transcend their insularity and generate networks. 99
Whether social capital accrues among individuals or among groups,
too much "glue" and not enough "bridges" builds an unhelpful
insularity.100
Ivan Light has noted that there are many kinds of "capital" -
"human," "cultural," "financial," "physical" - but that the only kind
available to poor people is "social." 101 Poor people can only turn their
social capital to advantage when they are free to leverage it into other
kinds. There is no one "good" kind of social capital - the "bonding"
95 For descriptions of the differences between "social leverage" and "social support," or
"coping capital," see Xavier de Souza Briggs, Brown Kids in White Suburbs, supra n. at
178; between "glue" and "bridges," see Lang & Homburg, supra n. at 4 and Putnam, supra
n. at 22; between "bonding" and "bridging" capital, see GI--rELL & VIDAL, supra n. at 15.
96 See Briggs, Brown Kids in White Suburbs, supra note 10 at 178.
97 Lang & Homburg, supra note 92 at 4.
98 See Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush & Felton Earls, Neighborhoods
and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 Sci. 918, 918 (Aug. 1997)
(noting that different neighborhoods have different capacities to band together to fight
crime and to demand better services, and, id. at 919, finding the root of these differences in
"collective efficacy, " defined as the "linkage of mutual trust and the willingness to inter-
vene for the common good .... ).
99 Colin C. Williams & Jan Windebank, Self-Help and Mutual Aid in Deprived Urban
Neighborhoods: Some Lessons from Southampton, 37 URB. STUD. 127, 137-8 (2000)(find-
ing that, in poor and working class households who rely on self-help and networks of infor-
mal mutual assistance to get by, the households with multiple earners, with expanded
contacts to colleagues at work, use such networks most successfully).
100 Lang & Homburg, supra note 92 at 6-7.
101 Light, supra note 86 at 149; for examples of networks that poor people form to make
the most efficient collective use of their resources, see CAROL STACK, ALL OUR KIN
(1974;)Kathryn Edin & Laura Lein, The Private Safety Net: The Role of Charitable Organi-
zations in the Life of the Poor, 9 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 541, 554-6 (1998)(interviewing
destitute mothers who coordinated their use of benefits to assist members of their ex-
tended families).
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capital that builds neighborhood cohesion and mutuality of care can
provide for sustaining personal and economic relationships. 10 2 Nor is
any one kind of social capital necessarily the marker of any one group;
no one socio-economic, ethnic, or racial group is particularly adept at
accumulating one kind or another. Poor people as well as affluent
people use "bridging" capital to get jobs,103 and both "bonding" and
"bridging" social capital to engage in grass roots advocacy and civic
activities.' 4 Social capital only becomes hurtful when bonds reinforce
exclusion as much as they build solidarity. Gated communities, civic
associations dominated by one demographic cohort,10 5 exclusionary
hiring halls and private clubs all exemplify, and all reinforce, the ra-
cial, ethnic or economic insularity of "negative social capital."'01 6 The
exercise of negative social capital can be overt or unthinking - the
bonding among the members of the excluding groups may be so in-
tense that they may fail to see that others are damaged by their insu-
larity.'0 7 The issue becomes who gets to enforce bonding capital
against whom. In short, whether social capital is good or bad depends
on how individuals or groups build it and use it: whether they isolate
others, or are isolated involuntarily from the kind of bridging capital
that enhances opportunity, forms heterogeneous, resource-rich net-
102 BRETT WILLIAMS, UPSCALING DowNTowN: STALLED GENTRIFICATION IN WASH-
INGTON, D.C. 76-84 (1988)(describing "the work of the street," the complicated patterns of
exchange of information and favors that characterize the financial and political economy of
one neighborhood in the District of Columbia).
103 Jeanne S. Hurlbert et al, Social Networks and Social Capital in Extreme Environ-
ments, in SOCIAL CAPITAL: THEORY AND RESEARCH 209, 225 (Nan Lin et al. eds., 2001)
(research finding that residents of poor neighborhoods use "weak ties," or bridging capital,
proportionally as often as residents of more affluent neighborhoods to get jobs).
104 Brian P. Conway & David S. Hachen, Jr., Attachments, Grievances, Resources, and
Efficacy: The Determinants of Tenant Association Participation Among Public Housing Te-
nants, 27 J. URB. AFF. 25, 48 (2005)(commenting that public housing residents in one large
study showed levels of civic engagement comparable to and exceeding those of
homeowners).
105 For one example of an abuse of civic activism that grew from the exclusionary use of
bonding social capital, see Briggs, Social Capital: Easy Beauty or Meaningful Resource?,
supra note 88 at 154 (white homeowners taking over the board of a community develop-
ment corporation and then eliminating the previous board's project to develop affordable
multi-family co-op housing that had been purchased by African American buyers).
106 For examples of the many impacts of "negative social capital," as not only excluding
outsiders, but also stifling innovation and advancement among insiders, see Alejandro
Portes, Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology, 24 ANN. REV.
SOCIOLOGY 1, 15-18 (1998).
107 That unconsciousness of the impact of such intense bonding capital could describe
any "white" or any other "privilege:;-"; in one example of the insularity of one group
bonded by economic privilege, an association of property owners succeeded in forcing a
slumlord out of his eyesore of a property, but throughout the campaign never consulted
with the tenants of the building, who as a result of the condemnation were evicted. KRIS-
TINA SMOCK, DEMOCRACY IN ACTION: COMMUNITY ORGANIZING AND URBAN CHANGE
73 (2004).
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works, and enables different kinds of capital to form. Too much bond-
ing capital among those with access to other kinds of capital insures
that social capital is not only the only kind that poor people have, but
the only kind that poor people will ever get.
B. From "Linking" to "Networks" and Why Community
Clients Need Them
Forty-five years ago, Jane Jacobs noted that small, insular neigh-
borhoods often excelled in maintaining control of local conditions, but
were powerless to protect themselves from external threats, such as
red-lining or absence of municipal services.108 In her view, neighbor-
hoods needed residents who engaged in what Jacobs referred to as
"hop-and-skip relationships," ties to persons with similar interests but
different, perhaps more influential connections, outside the immediate
community. 10 9 Urban sociologists and planners since have concurred
that impoverished neighborhoods suffer from isolation from a range
of resources, and that that isolation keeps their residents from finding
rewarding work, decent housing and a high quality of goods and
services. 110
Recent articulations of social capital theory address Light's con-
cerns about the limitations of "bonding" and "bridging" social capital
by including a third type: "linking."11' While "bonding" and "bridg-
ing" social capital have been characterized as "horizontal," "linking"
social capital is "vertical." "Linking" social capital connects commu-
nity-based organizations with the sources of real power: local, state
and federal governments, large commercial lenders, and major foun-
dations. In that function, linking social capital expands on the useful-
ness of "bridging" social capital, which develops between persons who
may be strangers, but who occupy similar statuses in terms of race,
class and political clout.112
The construct of "linking social capital" highlights a problem
which older social capital theory describes but cannot resolve: that the
process of building "bonding" or even "bridging" social capital mainly
occurs within the bounds of geographical community. For community
108 JACOBS, supra note 83 at 127.
109 Id. at 134.
110 See, e.g., PETER DREIER, JOHN MOLLENKOPF AND TODD SWANSTROM, PLACE MAT-
TERS: METROPOLITICS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY, Ch. 3, The Costs of Economic Segregation
and Sprawl 64-104 (2d ed 2004); Michael B. Teitz & Karen Chapple, The Causes of Inner-
City Poverty: Eight Hypotheses in Search of Reality, 3 CITYSCAPE 33 (1998).
111 Alan Middleton, Alan Murie & Rick Groves, Social Capital and Neighborhoods That
Work, 42 URB. STUD. 1711, 1716 (2005)(citing WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT RE-
PORT 2000-2001 at 128 (2001)).
112 Id. at 1716.
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empowerment strategies to work, alliances must transverse bounda-
ries not only of geography, but of race and class.113 Dependent on
repeat interactions between actors within easy or slightly extended
reach of each other, in resource-poor neighborhoods the "horizontal"
types of social capital suffer from anoxia. Without infusions of the
other kinds of capital that have been witheld from poor communities,
horizontal capital alone cannot sustain continued development.
114
These concerns about the insufficiency of social capital echo the cri-
tique of "place-based" community development policies.115 Even
those who admire the strength of social capital in poor communities
acknowledge that, without connections to more influential external
actors, local collaborations alone cannot compel changes in state-sanc-
tioned patterns of discrimination and disinvestment.1 1 6 Sometimes the
problems are simply too big and too structural for any one group to
face without the help of a diverse range of allies.11
7
Network theory supplies a framework for analyzing why the
groups with only internal resources can never become groups with
113 Peter Dreier, Community Empowerment Strategies: The Limits and Potential of Com-
munity Organizing in Urban Neighborhoods, 2 CITYSCAPE 121,139(1996); see also MARION
ORR, BLACK SOCIAL CAPITAL: THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL REFORM IN BALTIMORE, 1986-
1998, at 191-2 (1999)(concluding that even a socially cohesive and internally effective pres-
sure group of black activists could not succeed alone in implementing wide-ranging struc-
tural reform in school system, when long-established patterns of segregation had blocked
the black community from developing relationships with historically white controllers of
political and financial resources).
114 See Susan Brin Hyatt, From Citizen to Volunteer: Neoliberal Governance and the Era-
sure of Poverty, in, THE NEW POVERTY STUDIES: THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF POWER, POLIT-
ICS, AND IMPOVERISHED PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 201, 213-223 (Judith Goode &
Jeff Maskovsky eds. 2001)(criticizing programs that invest significant administrative au-
thority in community groups without accounting for their historic lack of access to training
and expertise).
115 For a summary of the "people-based" versus "place-based" debate in community
development policy, see GARY PAUL GREEN & ANNA HAINES, ASSET BUILDING AND
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 6 (2002); for what has become the definitive popular critique
against development that focuses on place, see Nicolas Lemann, The myth of community
development, N.Y.TIMES MAG., Jan. 1994,at 27.
116 John Calmore, A Call to Context: The Professional Challenges of Cause Lawyering at
the Intersection of Race, Space and Poverty, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1927, 1953-4 (1999)(ask-
ing for policies that expand "social leverage" and "social support" capital, to acknowledge
that the considerable social capital assets of poor communities alone may be insufficient to
compensate for years of malign neglect and deliberate witholding of resources).
117 Dreier, supra note 113 at 124-5(emphasizing that community-based organizations
may be able to achieve success in their own neighborhoods, but alone neither can affect
statewide or national agendas, nor secure resources that exist only at the state or federal
level); see also Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush & Felton Earls, Neighbor-
hoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCi. 918, 923 (Aug.
1997)(even cohesive neighborhoods with high levels of internal organization and lower
levels of street crime depend on external institutions of formal social control and external
resources for their stability).
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clout. While "social capital" represents the value that results from in-
teractions between either similar or dissimilar individuals or groups,
"networks" can be considered as the structures within which those in-
teractions occur. Networks come in different configurations. Some
consist of "peer to peer" relationships which, once created, maintain
themselves independent of any one powerful organizing institution.
These differ from "hub and spoke" networks, in which several mem-
bers connect to a central player but not to each other, and from "in-
termediary" networks, in which a central player such as a community
development corporation or university remains as a permanent force
for structuring and monitoring relationships among peers, or between
peers and itself.118  Most networks draw a little from all these
archetypes.
Successful networks share certain interior characteristics. One is
the agreement of the members to subordinate immediate, individual
advantage to the achievement of greater goals.119 There are several
necessary predicates to this willingness to adopt collective goals. One
is an accumulation of trust, something difficult to attain outside an
extended history of repeated, successful interactions in which mem-
bers have had the opportunity to cooperate in the exchange of infor-
mation and to have their cooperation reciprocated. 120 It may seem
obvious, but for groups collaborating to achieve transcendent social
reform, another feature is a shared political vision of social equality,
one that internalizes the norms of reciprocity and fair dealing essential
to the group's cohesiveness and that will sustain the faith that every
member of the group will pull its weight, even if a failure to assume
responsibility is not immediately visible. 121
Ultimately, however smoothly they may begin to function inter-
nally, networks, like individuals, must also reach beyond themselves,
expanding and diversifying. "Peer to peer" networks are critical to ini-
tial gathering of information and building of relationships. But net-
118 For a description of and schematics illustrating these types of networks, see HARRI-
SON & WEISS, supra note 94 at 45.
119 See Walter W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organiza-
tion, 12 ORG. BEHAVIOR 295, 303 (1990).
120 For one among many studies of "trust" and reciprocity, this one focusing on dynam-
ics within rather than between groups, see Roderick M. Kramer, Benjamin A. Hanna,
Steven Su & Jane Wei, Collective Identity, Collective Trust, and Social Capital: Linking
Group Identification and Group Cooperation, in GROUPS AT WORK: THEORY AND RE-
SEARCH 173, 174-7 (Marlene E. Turner ed., 2001).
121 MICHAEL H. BEST, THE NEW COMPETITION: INSTITUTIONS OF INDUSTRIAL RE-
STRUCTURING 237-9 (1990)(noting that groups can trust each other enough to learn from
each other if they share a collective vision of a just society, in which reciprocity and coop-
eration are expected behaviors, and that groups always risk damage from the action of
"'free-riders,"' self-seeking actors who harm the collective either through inactivity or
through harmful activity).
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works that fail to transcend the "peer to peer" model not only risk
stagnation as regular members grow too comfortable with established
patterns, but threaten discriminatory exclusion of unfamiliar groups.
In that sense, the damage done by static peer to peer networks resem-
bles that done by the overly bonded wielders of negative social capi-
tal. Network connections with "high constraints," that is, too, much
bonding or coping capital, that reinforce intimacy among a few play-
ers, produce cliques, not true networks.122 More than social capital
analysis, network analysis examines the impact of exclusionary prac-
tices on both the excluders and the excluded. Those who indulge in
the comfort of well-worn, repetitive interractions within the same net-
work of like-minded peers will fail to expand the network, and will
choke off not only new members but new information. 123 Failure to
expand, and then failure to link up even the expanded network with
diverse contacts can cause the network to implode.
Community development theorists have used network theory to
describe how levels of the community development system "link" the
most disconnected residents with nearby, and then with more remote,
resources of increasing capacity and influence. 12 4 Community devel-
opment corporations ("CDCs") self-consciously position themselves
in strategic positions between networks, in order to nurture "horizon-
tal" capital and provide "linking" capital.125 Although types of net-
works vary, all leverage the resources of the small, local and isolated
by linking them with the large, regional or national, and well-con-
nected. A few examples of successful networks illustrate how they in-
tegrate many levels of actor and information, maintaining close ties
but always working to keep them from getting stale. Generated by a
partnership between a national philanthropy (the Pew Charitable
122 Burt, The Gender of Social Capital, supra note 93 at 30 (1998).
123 Powell, supra note 119 at 305(stating that networks that rely on repeat relationships
among the same players, and fail to bring in infusions of new information from new
sources, become insular and exclusionary); Bennett Harrison & Amy K. Glasmeier, Why
Businesses Alone Won't Redevelop the Inner City: A Friendly Critique of Michael Porter's
Response to Urban Revitalization, 11 ECON.DEV.Q. 28, 35 (1997)(emphasizing the impor-
tance of businesses reaching beyond their like-minded "clusters" to organizations with dif-
ferent specialties, lest their familiar networks become rigid).
124 See Ronald F. Ferguson & Sara Stoutland, Reconceiving the Community Develop-
ment Field, in URBAN PROBLEMS AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 36-42 (Ronald F. Fer-
guson et al. eds., 1999)(illustrating relationships among hierarchies of "Level Zero"
through "Level 3" organizations, with Level Zero being volunteer organizations with un-
paid staff, and Level 3 organizations being national banks, foundations, and legislatures).
125 GEORGE GALSTER, DIANE LEVY, NOAH SAWYER, KENNETH TEMKIN & CHRIS
WALKER, THE IMPACT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONS ON URBAN
NEIGHBORHOODS 13-14 (Urb. Inst. 2005)(describing the "community capacity building"
activities and the strategic "structural" position of CDCs as "intermediary" between neigh-
borhood organizations and larger systems).
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Trust) and a local quasi-governmental entity (the Philadelphia Indus-
trial Development Corporation), the Urban Industry Initiative in Phil-
adelphia established networks of owners of small manufacturing
businesses, to enable them to exchange complementary expertise,
combine resources, and match buyers and sellers, with the goal of re-
taining and strengthening businesses in the city. 126 Some CDCs bol-
ster the economic health and political effectiveness of individuals and
organizations by training them in organization-building and advocacy
techniques, 127 and by connecting them to previously unapproachable
sources of capital and power. 128 Sometimes too small, or too strapped
for cash to take on extended projects in affordable housing and other
economic development, CDCs themselves often pool resources or
work in peer networks organized by foundations to enhance their
programmatic capacities. 129 They also combine forces to engage in
advocacy affecting their industry and their low income constituents. 130
Operating in many different countries in different contexts, lending
circles build relationships and expertise among peer small business
owners, while providing the all-important connections to the "hub"
lenders or to the "intermediary" mentors and advisers who link the
126 Gregg A. Lichtenstein, Building Social Capital, 23 EcON. DEV. COMMENT. 31, 33-4
(1999)(describing how two manufacturers had shared a common wall for seventy years and
never met, and that until the Initiative brought them together, they had no idea that one
could buy the products that the other had been sending out of state).
127 For an example of one CDC's horizontal networking activities, see William J. Tray-
nor & Jessica Andors, Network Organizing: A Strategy for Building Community Engage-
ment, 140 SHELTERFORCE 8-11 (March/April 2005) (describing Lawrence Community
Works, a CDC in one of many cities in Massachusetts that lost their economic base when
their textile mills shut down. The CDC organized dinners for hundreds of students in previ-
ously unconnected adult education and consumer literacy courses, enabling the partici-
pants to meet each other, hear news about city development projects, and be trained in the
skills of civic participation).
128 See GALSTER, supra note 125 at 59-62 (summarizing ways in which five CDCs used
their structural position as "intermediaries" to link residents to capital and political
influence).
129 See HARRISON & WEISS, supra note 94 at 111-119 (describing the Pittsburgh Devel-
opment Partnership, instituted by an alliance of Ford and other foundations and the city,
which acted as an intermediary to match CDCs, the CDCs' clients, and banks that sought
to satisfy their obligations under the Community Reinvestment Act by investing in urban
development projects); see also Christopher Walker, Community Development Corpora-
tions and Their Changing Support Systems 38-41 (Urb. Inst. 2002)(how two national in-
termediaries concentrated funding, board training and technical assistance in "support
collaboratives" for CDCs in twenty-three cities); Nancy Nye & Norman J. Glickman,
Working Together: Building Capacity for Community Development, 11 HousING POL'Y
DEBATE 163, 180 (2000)(describing how CDCs in Portland, Oregon, pooled resources for
projects in their overlapping geographical areas; and how CDCs in Boston contracted with
each other for small business lending).
130 David Holtzman, The Emergence of the CDC Network, 144 SHELTERFORCE 16
(Nov./Dec.2005).
[Vol. 13:67
Creating a Client Consortium
borrowers with lenders as well as with other resources. 131
These few out of many examples of networked manufacturers,
neighborhood institutions engaged in community development, and
nonprofit housing providers support the proposition that individual
institutional actors in resource-poor communities can achieve collec-
tively what none can accomplish alone. Regardless of structure, the
purpose of all these networks is to create frameworks within which
neighborhood groups and institutions of different kinds can collabo-
rate to combine and amplify their strengths. The superiority of the
efforts of actors performing in networks to those of actors performing
alone has become so accepted that funders expect and even require
applicants for grants to apply jointly with other partners, and to
demonstrate their past achievements as workers in different kinds of
collaborations. 132
VI. THE LAWYER AS ENHANCER OF "SOCIAL CAPITAL"AND AS
"MANAGER OF STRUCTURAL HOLES"
A. The Lawyer as Enhancer of Social Capital
The real-world examples of networks indicate that organizations
can and do ally with others to promote mutual and individual advan-
tage, either spontaneously or with the assistance of an intermediary/
organizer. The question is whether that organizer can or should be a
lawyer, acting in the ways that lawyers do to structure one-shot and
long-term relationships. The answer lies, of course, in the breadth and
flexibility of definition of "acting in the ways that lawyers do."
Even within the limitations of one-by-one representation, lawyers
clearly can and do enable their clients to build social capital of the
"coping" or "bonding" kind. They do so when they help to form
groups, and to advise them on how to function as groups. In that kind
of representation they advise the different members of the group on
the issues involved in creating a collective - a corporation or partner-
ship, or a more informal association that has not transformed itself
into a corporate entity. These issues may include how the members
will choose to govern themselves within the collective: who will lead
131 See BEST, supra note 121at 214(1990) (on consortia of cooperatives and small firms
in Italy, that collectively evaluate and then package and present members' applications for
loans, a vouching system that banks accept in lieu of developing their own underwriting
criteria); see also Lisa J. Servon, Credit and Social Capital: The Community Development
Potential of U.S. Microenterprise Programs, 9 HoUSING POL'Y DEBATE 115, 124
(1998)(describing Working Capital in Boston, in which small business owners form borrow-
ing groups to develop each member's application for a loan from Working Capital, remain
responsible as a group for that member's loan, and can each take on more loans only so
long as each member stays current in its individual payments).
132 See Hexter, supra note 82.
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them, how they will deliberate and make decisions, and where they
will set the thresholds for meaningful participation and the standards
for admission and expulsion. 133 Clients often demand greater aware-
ness of and engagement by their lawyers in their companies' day to
day operations. 34 Lawyers acting as "house counsel" advise on these
and other on-going matters of the organization, developing an even
richer relationship over time. 135 In short, when lawyers advise clients
as to what appear to be merely the minutiae of corporate governance,
they are also offering examples of the rules of engagement which cre-
ate the spaces within which social capital can grow.136
Lawyers help individual and group clients "bond." In the context
of the sociology of neighboring, when clients with internal capacity (or
"bonding capital") reach out to others for mutual advancement, they
"bridge," sometimes only formalizing already strong ties with known
actors, sometimes leaping to build a new relationship based on a weak
tie to a lesser known quantity. As I discussed earlier, lawyers fre-
quently help clients "bridge" when they advise on and articulate the
terms for business relationships, in resource-rich and resource- poor
neighborhoods alike. 137 They form joint ventures and write contracts
for one-time deals or repeat players. For parties that desire longer
term relationships, with broader visions for action, they form partner-
133 See Ann Southworth, Collective Representation for the Disadvantaged: Variations in
Problems of Accountability, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2463 (1999)(noting that attorneys
who had represented organizations engaged in serious "bricks and mortar" work in their
communities spoke of their clients' concrete accomplishments in the way of construction of
housing and community facilities, but also of how they assisted them in developing their
own capacity to govern themselves and to advocate for their positions).
134 See Jill Schachner Chanen, Constructing Team Spirit, A.B.A. J. 58 (Aug.
1997)(describing active engagement of some law firms in the day to day activities of their
corporate clients).
135 Lisa Finnegan, A Brand New World: Pro Bono Goes Corporate, WASH.LAw. 24
(May/June 1999)(describing the house counsel relationships formed in the first year of
D.C.'s Community Economic Development Pro Bono Project).
136 Stephen Ellmann's description of how the lawyer for an association could choose to
build her client's internal processes of governance to encourage democratic participation
exemplifies how a lawyer can think in terms of building her client's social capital, in that
instant capital of a "bonding" kind. Stephen Ellmann, Client Centeredness Multiplied: Indi-
vidual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in the Public Interest Lawyers' Representa-
tion of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103,1147-1152 (1992). See also Nancy Cook, Looking for
Justice on a Two-way Street, 20 J. L. & POL'V 169, 194 (2006) (reminding lawyers to appre-
ciate their clients' "bonding" capital).
137 See, e.g., Ann Southworth, Representing Agents of Community Economic Develop-
ment: A Comment on Recent Trends, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L.261 (2004); Ann
Southworth, Business Planning for the Destitute? Lawyers as Facilitators in Civil Rights and
Poverty Practice, 1996 Wisc. L. REV. 1121, 1134-9 (describing a range of non-litigation,
transactional activities such as negotiation, drafting, planning, and financing in which a
sample of lawyers in a survey engaged in the representation of community-based
organizations).
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ships and corporations of a range of kinds.138 Lawyers may also help
their individual or their "bridged" clients "link" to sources of influ-
ence beyond their usual frame of dealing: when they help them apply
for major public or foundation grants or commercial loans, assist them
in forming coalitions, or work with them to present legislative testi-
mony. It is in this last activity that lawyers come the closest to placing
their clients more permanently in contact with unfamiliar actors by
creating networks.
B. Lawyers as Managers of Structural Holes
Another way to view insular networks is as clusters of individuals
or groups, benefitting from bonding or even bridging social capital,
but stranded from each other on the far side of "structural holes."
"Structural holes" are gaps of information between individuals or
groups, different information that each possesses but that none has yet
shared. 139 Sharing the information might be useful, but for any one of
a number of reasons, none of the actors is aware that all concerned
might benefit from an exchange.1 40 The most useful actor is the "man-
ager" of the holes, one positioned outside of or at the fringes of orga-
nizations, who knows the information, knows the organizations, and
knows the optimum timing for connecting the organizations to trans-
mit the information.1 41
I propose that the community lawyer think of herself as the ulti-
mate manager of structural holes. It is a role that she assumes natu-
rally, as one whose status in the community already balances between
that of outsider and of insider, a position that encourages empathy but
stops short of perfect identification. Community lawyers enjoy daily
opportunities to extend themselves beyond the constraints of individ-
ual group clients. Informally, throughout their wide-ranging contacts
across a range of clients in any one neighborhood, lawyers may come
138 For a quick overview of how a lawyer might counsel business clients as to the range
of legally defined associational relationships available to them, see Michael E. Flowers,
Choosing the Right Business Entity, 40 PRAC. LAW. 21 (1994).
139 Burt, The Contingent Value of Social Capital, supra note 12 at 341. For an extremely
useful overview of both the history of social capital theory and the parallel development of
network and structural hole theory, applied to the debate over the value of independent
corporate boards, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Perspectives from Law and Social Psychology:
Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies: The Missing Link in Corporate
Governance, 70 BROOK.L.REV. 1313 (2005).
140 RONALD S.BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION
13-14(1992) (describing the "access, timing, and referral" benefits of transferring
information).
141 In a different context, that of foundations and CDCs collaborating together to en-
gage in workforce development in poor networks, Harrison and Weiss have described a
similar concept of "centrality," a person's or group's position in its network resulting from
its capacity to receive and transmit information. HARRISON & WEISS, supra note 94 at 38.
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across groups, unknown to each other, who would benefit by making
contact, to exchange information or even to do business together. All
the illustrations we have seen about the value of networks suggests
that to bring these strangers together would be of benefit to them. In
short, to build a "Client Consortium" would be the lawyer's
equivalent of creating a network from which the "bridging" form of
social capital could germinate. The Consortium would draw closed the
"structural hole" - the vacuum of information and the deprivation of
continuous contact - that had kept one or more community based ac-
tors with potentially complementary strengths apart.
The lawyer who seeks to formalize what she may already do in-
formally - to expand her community capacity-building to the creation
of networks, and to the management of structural holes - need not
venture so far beyond what lawyers conventionally do. I have noted
that lawyers in transactional practices already address the possibilities
- and problems - inherent in the "manager" role when they assist ex-
isting clients to form partnerships. As structural hole theory suggests,
the greater the disconnect between partners in a new business rela-
tionship, the greater the discomfort - but the greater the potential
benefit. Lawyers can use their connections and knowledge to bridge
the gap not only across the structural holes for the benefit of discrete
clients, but also for the benefit of the clients' vision of the common
good. We have seen that the ethics of lawyering advises caution about
- though not total prohibition of - the lawyer's behavior in these rela-
tionships. But the sociology of neighboring encourages their
formation.
While the role of structural hole manager seems to be a "natural"
for the community lawyer, the idea comes with caveats. If it is to apply
usefully to the idea of the lawyer convening a Client Consortium, the
"structural hole manager" needs some revision from its basis in the
sociology of organizations. The sociological model emerges from the
study of entrepreneurship and the use of networks to foster individual
advantage rather than to achieve some collective vision of social bet-
terment. 142 Too faithful an importation of the model into community
lawyering practice would risk repeating all the faults of the "regnant
idea" of lawyering,143 with the lawyer/manager controlling the flow of
information - even if she did so out of concern for her clients' welfare,
142 See GITELL & VIDAL, supra note 87 at 20-1 (assessing Burt's model as describing
some of the potentially worst aspects of expropriation of information, in which actors, such
as local government officials or well-placed organizations, in a position to control flow of
resources seize them for themselves and divert them from the community); see also Mitch-
ell, Perspectives from Law and Social Psychology, supra note 139 at 1324 (assessing struc-
tural hole theory as ". . .a theory of manipulation, opportunism, and inefficiency.")
143 See LoPEZ, supra note 46 at 23.
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rather than for personal gain. With that caveat, the manager of struc-
tural holes may serve as a model for the connections which lawyers
already make among their clients but might seek to develop more self-
consciously.
VII. A CONCLUSION, A CAUTION, AND A CALL FOR MORE WORK
A. A Vision or a Client: What Does the
Community Lawyer Represent?
Thomas Shaffer has urged lawyers to think sweepingly about col-
lective representation. .. "... not of lonely individuals in circumstan-
tial harmony, but of the harmony itself, or even of the communal
source of the harmony.1' 44 In commenting on the advisability of mul-
tiple representation within a partnership, Steven Lubet has posited a
hypothetical very similar to that of the Consortium in a business con-
text, even suggesting a scenario in which the lawyer acts as structural
hole manager in bringing the parties together to do what seems to be a
mutually advantageous deal. Yet as the scenario spins out of the con-
trol and the initially amicable partners end up at each other's throats,
he cautions that the unwary lawyer's mistake was to be swayed by the
client's superficially harmonious goals, and to ignore the client's in-
trinsically adverse interests.1 45
I have concluded that at least the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, and (perhaps) norms of responsible practice, at least con-
done if not encourage lawyers to represent multiple clients. In the
Community Client Consortium as well as in a business partnership, it
is that very ". . .harmony itself, and the communal source of the har-
mony, " evoked by both Shaffer and Lubet in very different contexts,
that the lawyer must ascertain in order to avoid Lubet's scenario. Ide-
ally, a deep understanding of the needs of each client will enable the
lawyer to extract and then represent their common needs. Such repre-
sentation should not require the lawyer to sacrifice her "loyalty" for
"impartiality"; she is demonstrating her loyalty to all her clients in the
Consortium by recommending a common course of action that she
considers to be advantageous to all.
Note that here the lawyer must tread a fine line. Here is the cau-
tion. She is not the "lawyer for the situation,"1146 for the "communal
144 Shaffer, supra note 20 at 974.
145 See Steven Lubet, Malpractice Alert: No 'Conflict," but a Conflict of Interest, 6 Bus.
L. TODAY 33 (Jan./Feb.1997)(telling the cautionary tale of the lawyer who created a joint
venture for two friendly entrepreneurs whom he had introduced and who had seemed to
meet each other's business needs perfectly, without fully considering whether their inter-
ests were compatible).
146 See Dzienkowski, Lawyers as Intermediaries, supra note 32 at 784 (disputing the ap-
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harmony," or even for "the community" - she is the lawyer for the
members of the Consortium who have already pledged their willing-
ness to share information and forego immediate individual advantage.
As Hazard and Hodes have noted, for a community lawyer operating
under the Rules of Professional Conduct, a more precise formulation
of "the situation" might be "the totality of interests. ' 147 For the cli-
ents in the Consortium, the interests might include a project as con-
crete as lobbying for a traffic light at a busy corner, or as amorphous
as improving the neighborhood. It seems to me that it is precisely the
mistake of assuming the omniscience typically attributed to the role of
"lawyer for the situation" that leads to misunderstandings, hurts, and
insults to the "intrinsic justifications" for the ethical rules. Although
the lawyer may serve as the point of connection to bring the discon-
nected members of the Client Consortium together, her knowledge of
the members or even of the issues she knows to be of concern to all of
them is of itself insufficient to presume consensus. Only continuing
conversation among all members of the network, lawyer included, can
locate the points of agreement and the necessary direction in which
any collaboration will advance. And it is the Consortium that pro-
vides a venue for that conversation.
B. Multiple Representation: Would You Try This At Home?
Hazard and Hodes attempt to resolve any lingering concerns
about the role of lawyers in multiple representation by re-casting the
lawyer's role. For them, the lawyer who represents a Consortium be-
comes a "facilitator"; her primary activity is one of counseling rather
than advocacy. 148 The lawyer for the Consortium could hardly see her-
self in this way - nor would her clients imagine that she could not
assume an advocate's role on their individual or collective behalf. As I
will note below, it is difficult to find examples from day to day practice
to illustrate how lawyers do affirmatively advance the interests of both
individual client groups and of the coalitions that they form, relying
on communications among those clients to save the lawyer from com-
promising any of those interests.
However, we can turn to finely drawn descriptions of client-law-
yer relationships, in which lawyers reflect on the ethical context of
their activities in building social capital and constructing networks. In
propriateness of the lawyer acting in a multiple representation as "counsel for the situa-
tion," the formulation attributed to Brandeis, and commenting that "the situation" offers
no intrinsic standards for representation, and gives nothing to which the clients can accord
informed consent).
147 HAZARD , JR. & HODES, 3d ed, 2004 Supp., supra note 34 at 11-42.
148 Id. at 11-39.
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thoughtful examinations of lawyering relationships with hypothetical
and real community groups, Shauna Marshall and David Dominguez
have assessed how, or whether, the networking and capacity-building
activities that community lawyers see as part and parcel of their trade
fit within the scope of lawyers' conventional activities. 149 Three of
their examples of community lawyering in action are particularly rele-
vant to consideration of the role of the lawyer as manager of struc-
tural holes and enhancer of social capital: the lawyer who convenes
networks of similarly situated individuals as a possible predicate to
collective action (the public education session and the potluck dinner)
and the lawyer as the coach in the development of the client's "re-
porter paradigm." Each example addresses a slightly different facet of
the lawyer's part in constructing and maintaining networks.
Marshall's hypothetical lawyer conducted evening classes on ba-
sic issues in landlord-tenant law. These classes served multiple func-
tions. One was as training in self-help and lay advocacy, a powerful
augmentation to traditional legal services under conditions of scar-
city.150 Another was to inform the lawyer about the problems com-
mon to many tenants. Perhaps most important, these sessions
connected tenants with each other, forging connections that promoted
possibilities for reciprocity and joint advocacy. 151 Dominguez and his
students built the foundation for grass roots advocacy groups and
community lawyering classes by organizing street festivals and weekly
pot luck dinners. Residents of the same housing complex, who had
been isolated from each other before, recognized through these infor-
mal gatherings that they shared common interests in public safety and
public transportation.15 2 In terms of the sociology of neighboring, in
this instance lawyers saw their function as that of developers of the
bridging kind of social capital.
Dominguez's students then went further, to assume the role of
managers of structural holes. Using their position as law students in a
university with multi-disciplinary resources, they pulled together a
team of "experts" from college sociology and political science classes
149 Marshall, supra note 6 at 147; David Dominguez, Getting Beyond Yes to Collabora-
tive Justice: The Role of Negotiation in Community Lawyering, 12 GEO.J.ON POVERTY L. &
POL'Y 55 (2005).
150 See, e.g., Wayne Moore, Operating Self-Help Branch Offices in Low-Income Minority
Communities, 37 CLEARINGHOUSE REV./J. POVERTY LAW & POL'Y 369 (2003)(describing
one strategy relying on technology and use of paralegals in satellite offices, to instruct poor
persons in lay lawyering tasks); Ingrid V. Eagly, Community Education: Creating a New
Vision of Legal Services Practice, 4 Clin.L.Rev.433 (1998)(criticizing the limited scope of
conventional legal services' "know your rights" education efforts, and offering new
models).
151 Marshall, supra note 6 at 164-5.
152 Dominguez, supra note 149 at 61, n.18.
Fall 2006]
CLINICAL LAW REVIEW
to survey transportation patterns and organize discussion groups
among residents about their transportation needs. The residents used
the information which these teams gathered to persuade a local bus
company to change its decision to eliminate a crucial bus route.153
These are examples of client networks waiting to happen and al-
ready in being: lawyer-initiated gatherings of persons whom the law-
yers theoretically could have assisted as individual clients, but chose
both for reasons of scarcity and strategy to bring together and to assist
- if not represent - collectively. Dominguez's training of community
members in negotiation skills also illustrates the role of lawyer as en-
hancer of both social capital and the more basic human capital. In
order for residents to negotiate from positions of seeming powerless-
ness, they need to see themselves not only as supplying something that
the adversary needs, but as powerful themselves. One way to build
that image of powerfulness was through narrative, in the development
of a "Reporter Paradigm": encouraging residents to describe their his-
tories and concerns first to each other, and then, once residents agreed
on a common narrative, to adversaries, with the goal of turning adver-
saries into partners. 154 In essence, Dominguez and his students as-
sumed the role of coaches to residents, assisting them in recognizing
the assets that they brought to the welfare of the collective, and in
developing their stories into positions that ultimately the residents
could use in face to face negotiations and in communications with
other parties.
Questions of confidentiality abound in Marshall's archetypal
"know your rights" sessions, and Dominguez's neighborhood meet
and greets, as they provide settings for multiple reciprocal flows of
information, from lawyer to participant and among participants. 155
Marshall is uncomfortable with "know your rights" sessions as a full
substitute for traditional legal representation - not from any sense that
these sessions are less valuable, but from what she perceives as a dis-
connect between the value of the network, and the ethical rules that
govern the interchanges within the network. Her hypothetical attor-
ney sees herself in a double bind. She must caution the participants
that even though she is informing them about the law, she is not their
lawyer, presumably because it would be physically impossible for her
to form an individual client-lawyer relationship with every one of
them. Since she is not their lawyer, the confidences exchanged be-
153 Id. at 65.
154 Id. at 76.
155 See also Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and
Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 506 (2001)(expressing concerns about inadvertent es-
tablishment of lawyer-client relationships in the context of pro se training sessions).
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tween her and the participants enjoy no expectation of confidentiality
or protection of privilege, and, even if some attorney-client relation-
ships were to attach, somewhere, the confidences exchanged among
the participants enjoy no legal status.156
Is it enough to say that the network will safeguard what the law-
yer cannot? Dominguez describes the sessions in which he and his stu-
dents encouraged the residents of the Boulders housing complex in
developing their "reporter paradigm" as forging greater trust and
openness among previously disconnected neighbors, as they saw their
increasingly intimate disclosures being treated with respect. 157 His ex-
ample suggests that the processes of bonding and then networking
create a framework within which individually and collectively respon-
sible "aggregate" representation can occur. There is no good answer
to the reality to which Marshall and other community lawyers must
reconcile themselves: that we are ethically ready for, but physically
incapable of, the task of simultaneously representing forty-some con-
stituents adequately. One of the few strategies open to us is to en-
courage the creation of representative groups (with all the
complications I have been discussing), in the hope that the act of com-
bining will both strengthen the individual and coalesced voices of the
clients, and ease the logistics of communication with us as lawyers.
My call for further work relates to learning what it is in fact that
many community lawyers do when faced with the possibility that mul-
tiple representation will serve their clients interests more fully than
will individual representation. As noted earlier, many organizations
enthusiastically participate in networks in which they share informa-
tion about their industries, disclose information about themselves, and
engage in transactions. But more investigation is required to find out
whether someone other than lawyers brings groups such as these to-
gether. Ann Southworth's excellent work, drawing from her extensive
structured interviews of practicing lawyers, suggests a model. Anecdo-
tal evidence of the sort gleaned from case decisions, or bar opinions,
of necessity only highlights the instances in which multiple representa-
tion goes wrong. A next phase of inquiry should include a survey of
community lawyers in the field, to get a fuller picture of whether they
have worked with de facto or deliberately constructed consortia of
clients, either for discrete projects or in on-going collaborative rela-
tionships, to reach goals that no single client could have achieved on
its own.
156 Marshall, supra note 6 at 184.
157 Dominguez, supra note 149 at 81.
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